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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RI OHl\1: 0 ND. 
JOSEPI-I HORS~fAN 
vs. 
RICHl\fOND, F,REDERICJtSBURG AND POTOl\fAC 
. HAILROAD COl\iP ANY. 
To the Honorable Judges of the Suprente Court of Ap11eals: 
Your petitioner, Joseph Jlorsman, respectfully represents 
that he is aggrieved by a final judgment of the Circuit Court 
for Arlington County, rendered against him on, to-wit, the 4th 
day of January, 1929, in an action of trespass on the case, 
wherein your petitioner, suing for the use and benefit of 
himself and the Fruit Growers Express and the Travellers 
Insurance Company as their respective interests may be 
shown, was plaintiff and the Richmond, Fredericksburg and 
Potomac Railroad Company was defendant, whereby your-
petitioner was denied the right to recover and said action was 
dismissed at his costs, of ivhich the record is hereto at-
tached. 
ST.ATg~IENT OF FACTS. 
Your petitioner (hereinafter designated plaintiff) on tl1e 
lOth day of December, 1924, was an employee of the Fi·uit 
Growers Express, a Corporation operating a car repair yard 
in Potomac Yards, in Arlington County, Virginia, for the 
repair of sundry cars owned by said Company and operated 
and caused to be operated liy it in intrastate and interstate 
commerce ( Trs., 32). Plaintiff was then in excellent healtl1, 
not quite twenty-one years of age and had been continuously 
employed by said Company since Octob~r 4t~, 1922. On De-
cember 10, 1924, and for about eighteen months prior thereto 
plaintiff's employment was as a car pai:nter at a co.mpensa-
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tion of $4.00 per day. The Richmond, Fredericksburg and 
Potomac R.ailroacl Company (hereinafter designated defend-
ant) is a corporation engaged in the operation of a steam 
J·ailroad and maintains sundry tracks in said Potomac Yards 
and elsewhere in said County over which it operates trains 
in both intrastate and interstate commerce. Said defendant 
is in no wise connected with the Fruit Growers Express, 
plaintiff's employer. 
On the lOth day of Decmnbcr, l 924, plaintiff at the eli rec-
ti on of his foreman, one .Julian Bettis ( Trs., 33), likewis·e an 
employee of said Fruit Growers Express (hereinafter desig-
nated as Company) procured some stencils, brushes and paint 
and accompanied said foreman to a string of bv·enty-five cars 
owned by said Company, then all stationary. with no motive 
power thereto attached standing on the advance track in that 
portion of said Potomac Yards known as the West Yard. 
Upon arrival at said line of cars with his said foreman, plain-
tiff was directed by said foreman to re-stencil certain por~ 
ti ons of the numhe"rs on both sides of a car owned by his 
employer, which car was the seventh or eighth one from the 
end of the said long· line of ears then standing on said track. 
The re-stenciling· of said nnn1ber was necessitated by reason 
of the replacement of sundry hoards in both sides of said 
ca.r. After receiving such ii1structions from his foreman, 
who then left, plaintiff proceeded 'vith the performance of 
the directed work : 
After completion of such work on the east side of said car, 
plaintiff in accordance with the rule, practice and custom of 
all other employees engaged in· similar work, all of which 
was well known to defendant, took his paint, brushes and 
stencils and started under said car to the opposite or west side 
thereof to complete the clirec.ted work thereon, said line of 
cars being then stationary and with no motive pow·er thereto 
atta.ched. (Trs., 34.) 
As plaintiff reached the west rail of the track he put his 
paint, brushes and stencils out from under the car and placed 
hoth hands on the rail to pull his body from under the car. 
vVhile in this position, defendant, in order to clear a main 
line track in said yard eansed a shifting engine then owned 
and ope1·ated by it to be backed without any warning to plain-
tiff and with gTeat force into said stationary line of cars 
setting them in Inot!on and causing tho rear truek wheels 
of the ca1· under which plaintiff then was, to pass over and 
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severely mang-le, cut and crush both of plaintiff's wrists and 
· hands. (T1·s., 35.) 
No investigation was made by defendant's employees in 
charge of its shifting engine to ascertain whether plaintiff or 
any other employees of said Company were then working un-
der, on and about said cars, although defendant's employees 
]nww that plaintiff and other employees of said Company were 
daily and constantly working in,· about, under and upon said 
Company's cars standing on said track. Under the cus-
toms and practices in said yard, defendant's employees op-
erating its said shifting engine knew they should not back 
same into and upon said line of cars withoi1t first ascertain-
ing if plaintiff or any other employees of said Company were 
then working in, nuder, about or upon any of said cars and 
·without first seeing that they were ~n a place of safety. 
Immediately after suffering said injuries plaintiff was re-
moved to the Alexandria City I-Iospital where he remained 
from the ] Oth day of December, 1924, to the 24th day of Feb-
l'uary, 1925. 'Vhcn in said hospital plaintiff underwent two 
operations, the first for the removal of both of his hands and 
wrists and the second for the removal of a portion of the 
bone from l~is right arm. (Trs., 35-36.) 
ST.ATE~IENT OF THE CASE. 
At the time of plaintiff's employment he and his master, 
the Company aforesaid, respectively accepted the provisions 
of the 'Vorkmen 's Compensation 1\.ct, and accordingly memo-
randum of agreement between tl1em as to compensation un-
der the Act was duly executed. ·(Trs., 15-16.) The insurance 
.carrier of said master is the Travellers Insuranee Company. 
Pursuant to said agreement, and after due course, the In-
dustrial Commission of this State, by its order entered Janu-
ary (ith, 1925, awarded plaintiff $12.00 per week for 375 weeks, 
payahle every two w·eeks, beginning December 10, 1924, suh-
jeet to an allowance to plaintiff's then counsel of a fee of 
$50.00 (Trs., 17 -1B), 'vhicl1 payments have been and are be-
ing made to plaintiff by said insurance carrier. Defendant, 
·an- inrle1Jenrlen.t tort fea.sor, has made no payments of any 
c11aract.er to plaintjff for the admittedly great damage in-
flicted upon him and the pain and anguish suffered by him 
as a result of its gross negligence. 
Plaintiff waited for his employer, said Fruit Growers Ex-
press Company and its insurance carrier, t.he Travellers In-
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surance Company, to institute an action for their joint benefit 
and his against the defendant, an indepedent tort feasor and 
when neither of them instituted such proceedings and in or-
der to prevent the cause of actiQn against said defendant from 
being barred by the statute of limitations, plaintiff, on the 
Bth day of December, 1925, filed an action of trespass on the 
case in the Circuit Court of Arlington County, Virginia, 
against the. defendant as· au independent tort feasor for the 
recovery of damages in the ·sum of $75,000.00. (Trs., 1.) 
The declaration contains two counts (Trs.,. 2-9) and avers 
i-nter alia that plaintiff's injuries and damages 'vere solely 
and proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant 
as an independent fort feasor. 
Defendant appeared by counsel and filed a special plea to 
said action to which plaintiff filed a motion to strike. ( Trs., 
10-12)~ 
Thereupon defendant voluntarily and before the lower 
Court passed upon plaintiff's said motion to strike and dis-
miss said special plea, filed au amended special plea witk 
a certified copy of the said proceedings before the Industrial 
Commission ~hereto attached as an exhibit (Trs., 13-20). 
Said .amended special plea presents a single issue, to-"rit, that 
plaintiff, having accepted compensation from his employer 
under the \Vorkmen 's Compensation Act, cann()t maintaiu 
this action against defendant, admittedJ.!y an independent 
tort feasor. Plaintiff filed a motion to strike out said amended 
special plea. on the ground inter alia that acceptance by plain-
tiff of compensation under said Act does not bar him from 
proceeding against defendant, an independent tort fea.sor 
solely responsible for the damages negligently inflicted upon 
him by its servants and agents. The lower Court by order 
entered July 11, 1927 (Trs., 22), overruled plaintiff's said 
motion to which ruling plaintiff duly excepted, leave being 
. granted plaintiff to file such additional pleadings as he might 
desire. 
Thereupon plaintiff, without waiving his exception to said 
n1ling of the lower Cotll't, on, to-wit, the 20th clay of Febru-
ary, 1928, filed his replication to said special plea (Trs., 23-
.24) ~ Thereafter at the October, 1928, ter mof said Court~ 
plaintiff moved the Court for leave to endorse the original 
writ and dec.lara tion with the statement that: 
''This action filed by plaintiff, Joseph Horsman, is for the 
Joseph Horsman v. R .. , F,. & P. R .. I=t. Co. 5 
usc and benefit of the Fruit Growers Express and the Trav-
ellers Insurance Company and the plaintiff, Joseph Horsman, 
as their respective interests may be shown." 
\Vhich motion was g-ranted over tlie objection and. excep-
tion of defendant, and said endors~mcnt was accordingly 
made. Thereupon plaintiff filed without waiving his said ex-
ception to the ruling of the Court on his motion to strike out 
said amended plea, an amended replication to said special 
plea (Trs., 25-26), to which defendant filed a general re-
joinder which issue came on to be heard by the lower Court 
at its October term, 1928, without a jury, trial by jury being 
waived. 
Thereupon the lower Court again refused to strike out said 
amended special plea. of the defendant to which action of the 
Court plaintiff duly excepted and thereupon plaintiff pro-
duced as witnesses in his behalf, Ashley Snellings, John 
~eravers and himself to support the allegations of the declara-
tion, and to prove that defendant was an independent to1·t 
!easo1· and as such negligently and carelessly inflicted upon 
him the injurie~ in the way and manner set forth in the 
4
' Statement of Facts", and as charged in the declaration to 
establish the extent of said injuries and the damagef? sus-
tained by him, to the admission of all of which evidence de-
fendant by counsel objected and all of which evidence the 
lower Court, upon motion of defendant a.nd over the excep-
tion of plaintiff, struck out, excluded and refused to w.eigh 
and consider; (and o\rer the objection and exception of plain-. 
tiff admitted evidence nuder the special pleas as to the com- · 
pensation received by plaintiff from the Travellers Insur-
ance Company, the insurance carrier of his said employer) 
and said Court being of the opinion that the acceptance by 
plaintiff of compensation from the insurance carrier of his 
employer, barred the rig-ht to institute and maintain this ac-
tion for the joint use and benefit of plaintiff, his employer 
and the insurance carrier of his employer as their respective 
interest might be shown against the defendant an independ-
eiit tort feasor by its final order entered January 4, 1929 
(Trs., 27-30), dismissed this action at the costs of plaintiff. 
Plaintiff presented to the lower Court his bill of exception, 
incorporating the evidence offered in his behalf which was 
duly certified and made a part of the record. (Trs., 31-40.) 
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ASSIGNl\IENTS OF ERROR. 
The following errors are assigned: 
1. The Coui't committed error in overruling plaintiff's mo-
tions to strike out and .reject both the orig·inal and· amended 
special pleas. 
2. The Court commi Heel error in rejecting, excluding· and 
refusing to consider the evidence introduced· and offered. for 
and in behalf of plaintiff. 
3. r~rhe Court committed errol: in overruling plaintiff's ob-
jection to the evidence introduced and offered for and in he-
half of d_efendant in support of its special plea and in ad-
mitting· and consideri1ig said evidence. 
4. The Court committed error in overruling plaintiff's sev-
eral motions. 
a. In arrest of judgment. 
b. To set aside its said judgment because it is contrary 
to the law and the eYidence and witl1out evidence to support. 
it. 
c. For the ascertainment of the amount of plaintiff's dam-
ages and the entry of jnclgnient therefor against defendant 
·fen: the benefit of plainti1f, the Fruit Growers Expre_ss and 
the 1~ravellers Insurance Company as their respective in-
terest might appear and he ascertained. (rrrs., 30 and 44.) 
':rhe single question presented in the instant case is one of 
law, in ·dew· of the rulings of the lower Court. 
rrhe sundry assignments of error are thought to be so 
c1osc]y inter"\\Toven as to neeessitate no separate discussion 
thereof, and they will therefore he jointly considered. 
The lower Court held as a matter of law that plaintiff, by 
accepting compensation from his employer, the Frnit Grow-
ers Express, was thereby barred from instituting this 'action 
in his own name for recovery against defendant, an indepencl-
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ployer, the Fruit Growers Express and the Travellers Insur-
ance Company, as their respective interests might be ascer-
tained. · 
Defendant elected to rest its case upon the narrow ques-
tion of law that plaintiff was barred from instituting and 
prosecuting this action by the acceptance of such compensa-
tion and entered no denial by either pleading or proof that 
it was an independent tort feasor and as such negligently in-
jured plaintiff. 
Plaintiff's evidence, all of w·hich was rejected as afore-
said over his objection and exception establishes without 
contradiction that: 
(1) Defendant was an independent to1·t feasor. 
(2) Defe~1dant negligently caused the injuries to plaintiff. 
(3) Plaintiff thereby and as the proximate result of such 
negligence, spent seventy-six days in a hospital, underwent 
hYo operations, the first for the removal of both his wrists 
and hands and the second for the removal of a part of the 
bone in his right arm, for which he is receiving compensation 
at the rate of $12.00 per week begilining December 1.0, 1924, 
payable every two weeks for a period of 375 weeks, from the 
Traveller~ Insurance Company, (Trs., 36-17}, the insurance 
carrier of\ his employer, which com pen sa tion as testified to 
by him he \acc.epted, with no knowledge that by so doing he in · 
anywise waived his rig·ht to recover appropriate damages 
from the defendant herein, subject to the reimbursement of 
his employer and said huntrance carrier of such sums as 
are paid to him and for his use by them. 
Defendant's solo defense under its special plea is predi-
cated upon the provisions of Section 12 (:Michie's Code, 1924, 
Section 1887 (1.:2) of the \'7orkmeu's Compensation .A .. c.t, as 
amended, Acts 19:24, page 478. The bald question thereby pre-
sented and '\Ye respectfully submit, erroneously answered in 
the neg·ative by the lower Court is: 
Can a servant, who with his employer, elects to accept the 
provisions of the Act as amended and who has been injured 
a.s the result of admitted gross negligence by an independent 
tort feasor, after accepting· compensation under the Act from 
his employer paid by his insurance carier, thereafter, and 
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·upon default and failure of both the e·mployer and the insur-
ance car1·ier to so do, institute an action for the use of him-
self, his employer and that insurance carrier as their re-
spective interests may be shown, against the independent 
tort feaso1· for the recovery of the actual damages sustained 
as the proximate result of negligence on the part of said in-
dependent tort feasor or third party 1 The question has been 
answered in the affirmative under section 12 of the Act as 
amended in 1920 by thi8 Honorable Court, in the casp. of 
Stnith v. Virginia Railway and Power Gon~pany; 144 Va. 169, 
decided tT an11ary 14, 1926. · . 
In that caR~, and under said section of the Act, as it then 
existed, the right of plaintiff Stratton, an employee of the 
Power Company and a motorman on one of its cars who was 
injured as a result of the neg-lig·ent operation by the defend-
aut Smith of his automobile, to recover damages from t.be 
defendant, an independent tort feasor, was establishecl In 
that case, as in the instant case, plaintiff accept~d compen-
sation from ·his ·employer, and upon the· failure of his em-
ployer to file action against the independent tort feasor, he 
filed action in his ow·n name, and thereafter amended his no-
tice of motion by inserting therein in appropriate places, 
"Virginia Rail)vay and Power Company, \lrho sues in the 
name of Willie Lee S'tratton". As pointed out by P1·entis, P., 
· speaking- for this Honorable Court, page 178 of the opinion, 
such amendment of the notice of motion was not necessary, 
all that was necessary was to have endorsed the writ or the 
·declaration with the statement that the action of plaintiff 
S'tratton was also for the benefit of the Virginia Railway 
Power Company, as its interests might be shown; the latter 
procedure was adopted in the instant case, both the writ and 
declaration being endorsed to show that the action was for 
the use of plaintiff, his employer, the Fruit Growers Express 
and the insurance carrier, Travellers Insurance Company, 
as their respective interests might be shown. 
In the Smith case, as in Hw instant case, defendant filed a 
special plea alleging that under Section 12 of the Act plaintiff 
cou-Id not maintain his action, ''said action having by opera-
tiQn of law been assigned to the Virginia R.ailway and Power 
Company.'' 
Judge Prentis, after quoting the provisions of Section 12. 
of the .. A.ct, as it· then existed, in disposing adversely of the 
defense set forth in the special plea, says in part·: 
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"The contention is that Stratton could not maintain .the 
ftc-tion because of the first clause of section twelve of the act, 
hereinbefore quoted. That claltse, nowever, refers only to the 
~·~nte:Zy of an entplo.yee aga:inst his employet:, and it is only 
,·ns nght to sue hzs e·mployer for dantages ~vhwlt is barred by 
the acceptance of co·1npensat·ion ·zf.nder the act. No argument 
to support this conclusion is necessary, as it seems to us 
because he who runs may read it in the statute." (Italics 
ours.) 
"The stat·ute s·ubrogating the mnplo;l}er to the t·i,qhts of the 
emzJloyee was not enacted for the benefit of the negli,f}ent third 
pa·r!y; he has slight interest in it. II e ·rwma:i-ns l-iable for the 
enf:tre antount of such da·mages a.s ntay be lawfully recov·ered 
of ki1n. The most that he could possibly claim is that after 
judgment he would. be interested in having the proper ap-
portionment made between the emp~oyer who has . paid the 
compensation and the employee, if the recovery against him 
should exceed the amount paid to such employee under the 
\compensation act. So, in this case, it was not necessary to 
amend the notiee of motion. Every interest which the de-
fendant had would have been fully protected by endorsing 
the wTit or the declaration ·with the statement that the action 
of Stratton was for the benefit of the Virginia Railway and 
Power Company, as its interest might be shown. 'l'hat Uti~ 
is the common and approved practice in this State is shown 
by several cases." (Italics ours.) 
Introductory to consideration of the 1924 amendment to 
section 12 of the Aet brief reference to the universally recog-
nized objects and purposes of remedial legislation of the 
character of \Vorkmen 's Compensation Acts will be made. 
(1) The underlying purpose of the Act of this State (and 
it might be added of every State adopting similar legisla-
tion), is to give relief to wo·rkmen. 
C. ct 0. Ry .. Co. v. Palmet·, 149 Va. 560. 
(2) The statute is highly remedial and niust be liberally 
construed in favor of the workman; it is an elf ort on the part 
of the State to i?l-8ure the workrnan to a limited extent, and 
its beneficial provisions should be extended to every class of 
workman who can fairly be brought within it. 
llwntphries v. Roxley Co., 146 Va. 106. 
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(3) No provisions of the statute were enacted for ihe 
benefit of a negligent third part, he has slight interest in it. 
l-Ie remains liable for the entire amount of such damages as 
may be lawfully recovered of him. 
Sntith v. V a.. Ry. & P. Co., supra. 
( 4) Defendant is expressly excluded £rom the benefits and 
burdens of the Act of this State. :M:ichie 1887 (9). 
( 5) Under the .A. ct. the common law defenses of negligence 
on the part of the employee, a fellow servant and assump-
tion of risks are abolished. :fifichie, 1887 (16). 
( 6) No assignment of compensation can be made and all 
~ompensation and claims thereunder shall be exentpt [r01n aU 
clai1ns of cred·itors. 
l\Iichie, 1887·, ( 22). 
(7) The Act docs not contemplate full co1n1Jensa.tion, the 
1naxi1nwm anwunt of $4,500.00 be·i1zg fixed for all i·njuries a·nd 
also death. 
niichie, 1?87' ( 30). 
In the amendment of 1924 made to section 12 of the Act 
no change was made in the first paragraph of the act of 
19~0. rl~his paragraph was hcl<l in the Sm,ith case, supra, to 
refer only to the rentedy of the employee against his em-
ployer. 
The amend1nent of 1924, material to .the question in the 
instant case was by the addition to the Act of 1920, imme-
diately following the first paragraph of the Act of 1.920 of 
the following language: 
"Pro,v-ided, however, that where s-u.ch wmployee, his pwr-
so·nal representative or otlzer person 'may have a right to 1·e-
cover dama,qes for s-uch i,n.Jury, loss of servi-ce or dea.th frmn 
any tJerson or pcrsou-s other than s·nch employer, he may in-
st-ih.de acn act-ion a.t law aga.inst surh third person or 11ersons 
before an awa.rd is m.a.de u.nder this act a.-n.d prosecu .. te the 
sa·me to ·its final de.f.enni.na.tion, but either the acceptance of 
un a,wa-rd here-under, or the procurement of a. judgment in a'n 
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act-ion at law, shall be a bar to p;roceeding further with the 
alternate renwdy." 
The only material change made in the second paragraph 
of the Act of 1920 by said amendment; was to strike out the 
wprds beginning said paragraph, to-wit: 
"The making of a lawful claim against an employer for 
compensation under this act,'' and to insert in lieu thereof: 
"The acceptance of an award under this Act against an 
employer for compensation, ' 1 and to add thereto the fol-
lowing: 
"If the injured e·mployee, his JJersonal 1·epresen.tative or 
other person, entitled so to do has 'made a claim, under this 
act aga;inst his e·mployer, a-nd has not proceeded a.gainst s~tch 
other party, the em1J/.oyer. 1nay, ·in order to prevm~t the loss 
of his 1·ights by the lJassage of ti1ne, ~institute such act~ion pr-ior 
to the m.aking of m1. award he1·eunrler. '' (Italics ours.) 
Paragraphs three ·and four of the 1924 amendment are· in 
every material aspect, the same as found i11 the concluding 
portion of paragTaph oue~ and in paragraph two of the Act 
of 1920, and as s~1me are deemed most material in considera-
tion of the question presented, they will for the convenience 
of this IIonorablc Cou:d, be set forth in fulL 
"The am.ou.nt of r·o1npcnsat·ion paid by the employer o·r the 
amo"Unt of compe1lPatit 11. to which the in,iurNl employee or 
h-is rlcnendents art f"nf itlerl shall uot be admiss-ible as evi-
dence in a-ny act·i,o·n bro-u~qht to reco·ver danta.ges, but any 
amount collected bu the employe-r under .the provisions of 
this section in. e:rress of the a-'m.ou.nt pa-id b:11 the e·mployer or 
for which 71 e is l{able shall be held by the e?nployer for the 
benefit of the in}ured employee or other person entitled there-
to less such amounts as are paid l)y the employer for reason-
able expenses, and attorney's fees. Prov·ided, that no com.-
1J1·omise settle1nent shall be m.a.rle by the e·JnplOJJer o·r in.~U'I'­
ance carrier in, the ea~ercise of su.ch ri,qht of subrogat-ion with-
ont the approval of the industrial co·m·mission and the i1?.i?wed 
employee, or the personal 1·epresentative or dependents of the 
deceased employe, be,ing first had .a.nrl obtained. 
"Where any employer is insured ag·ainst liability for com-
pensation with any insurance carrier, and such insurance 
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carrier shall have paid any compensation for which the em-
ployer .is liable or shall have assumed the liability of the em-
ployer therefor, it shall be subrogated to all the ;rights and 
duties of the employer, and may enforce any such rights in 
its own name or in the name of the injured employee or his 
personal representative; provided, however, nothing }1erein 
shall be construed as conferring upon insurance carriers any 
other or further rights than those existing in the employer 
at the time of the injury to his employee, anything in the 
policy o~ insurance to the contrary notwithstanding." (Italics 
ours.} 
The question presented in the instant case 11nder the 1924 
amendment to section 12 of the Act is _one of first impression 
in this State so far as we have been able to ascertain. 
r.l,.he lang·uage of Judge \Vest, speaking for this Honorable 
'Court in the case of So. Rwy. Co. v. U. 8. Cas. Co.~ 136 Va. 
482, to the effect that under said section in ·the Act of 1918 
·(identic with the first paragraph of said Act of 1920 and 
]9~4), the employee to whom compensation was paid for per; 
sonal injuries was debarred from pursuing all other rights 
and remedies on account of such injuries, we regard as 
obite·r. 
If not correctly so regarded, suffice to· say the later con-
struction placed tl1ereon in the f§mith v. R. R. Co., case, S'lt.pra~ 
overrules the language of this· Honorable Court in the So. 
Rwy. Co. v. U. S. Cas. Co., case, su.pra, to the effect that said 
portion of present section 12, relates solely to the re1nedy 
of the mnployee against the em.ployer and that it is only his 
right to sue the employer for (/ama_qes which is barred, con-
trols. 
Admittedly the portion of the amendment of 1924, to the 
effect that: 
"Either the acceptance of an award hereunder~ or the pro-
curement of a judgment in au action at law shall be a bar to 
proceeding- further with the alternate remedy,'' 
is positive language, and if it stood alone would bar the righ( 
of au injured employee who has accepted co1npensat·ion from 
his employer under the Act from suing an independent tort 
feasor for da:ma.ges negligently caused by it. 
However, the quoted language does not stand ·alone, and 
when construed with other material language of said section 
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preserving the rig-hts of the injured employee in any recov-
ery from an independent tort feasor; and further when the 
beneficial purposes of the \Vorkmen 's Compensation Act are 
considered, we submit, the amendment does not bar the right 
of such employee to sue for the joint use and benefit of him-
self, his employer and the insurance carrier, in the event of 
tht failure of either the employer or insurance carrier to sue 
the independent tort feaso1·. 
In support of such contention, in addition to the admittedly 
remedial scope of the Act in so far as the employee is c·on-
cerned, attention is directed to the following provisions of 
the Act: 
(1) The assignment of the interests of the employee in 
the right of action against the independent tort feasor to the 
employer and in turn to the insurance carrier either paying 
c<:>mpensation or assuming- the obligation of the employer 
therefor, does not d-ivest the injured employee of all interest 
in such cause of action. U ncler the express terms of said 
section: 
(a) ''Any amount collected by the employer under the 
provisions of this section in excess of the amount paid by the 
employer, or for which he is liable shall be held by the em-
ployer for the benefit of the injured employee or other per-
son entitled thereto, less such amounts as are paid by the 
employer for reasonable expenses and. attorney's fees." 
If the assignment by law divests all interests of the em-
·ployee, why is his interest in any recovery retained? 
(b) ''The amount of compensation paid by the employer 
or the amount of compensation to which the injured employee 
or his dependents are entitled shall not be admissible as evi-
dence in any action brought to recover damages.'' 
~~he measure of damages in so far as the employer or in-
surance carrier paying or assuming liability is concerned, is 
the amount of compensation paid or ·the liability for the pay-
ment of which is assumed. If the injured servant has no in-
terest after accepting compensation. why did the legislature 
expressly provide that evidence as to what would otherwise 
lJe the t·rue ·measure of dan,ages shall not be ad·m,issible in evi-
dence? 
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. (c) '' J..' o co·mpro1nise settle1nent shall be 1nade by the em-
ployer or insurance carrier in the exercise of such right of 
subrogation without the a.pproval of the Industrial Commis-
sion and the ·injured e·1nployee, or the persona.Z Tepresentat·ive 
o1· dependents of the deceased mnployee, being first had and 
obtained.'' 
If the employee has no rig·hts against tile negligent third 
party, why give him absolute control oveT any com1Jr01nise 
attempted to be made by his employer or insurance car1:ier 
as the case may be f 
The answer to the above questions, we submit, is that the 
assignment of the injured employee's rights and the subroga-
tion thereto of his employer or the insu ranee en rrier as the 
case may be, does not and was not intended to divest the in-
jured employee of all rights in the eause of action against 
the negligent third party; and that such subrogation is merely 
for the benefit of the employer or insurance carrier as the 
case may be, and not for the benefit of the negligent third 
party. A.t best the employer or insurance carrier is a trus-
tee so to speak, lJri·ma.rily vested with the right to sue the 
negligent third party, and clearly in the event of the failure 
of such trustee to sue, the cestui q·ue trust, the injured em-
ployee has the right to bring suit for the use of himself, his 
employer and the insurance carrier, as was done in the case 
of Sm.ith v. li"'. lly. P. Co., supra, and in the instant case. 
Clearly the legislature did 11ot intend to permit what it 
expressly declared could not he directly done without the 
!consent of the employee, to-wit, compromise a suit after it 
had been filed, to be done indirectly, to-wit, permit the em-
ployer or insurance carrier, if either of them saw fit, to com-
promise to tlw exclusion and perhaps damage of the employee 
in consideration of no suit being file. This thought is not 
met by the suggestion which we admit to be true, that in the 
instant case there is no proof of any such action on the part 
of defendant and the employer and the insurance carrier a1id 
that they arc justly above any such impntatjon. The point 
is that the denial of the right to maintain and recover in the 
instant case, would in effect prove tlw way for such 11ro-
cedure on the part of irresponsible 110gligent third parties 
nnd conscienceless employers and theh· insurance carrie1·s; 
·would lead to fraud and permit the perpetration of 'vTongs 
against which the legislature so carefully guarded. 
It is further to be borne in mind ·that the maximum com-
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pensation fixed by the Act i1~ this State is only $4,500, rather 
than an unlimited amount in similar Acts of other S'tates to 
which our attention has heen drawn. 
The Acts of other States have been fruitful of litigation 
and some of the pertinent decisions from other Courts will 
now be cited. 
llioeser v. Shunk, (1924), 116 l(ansas 247, 226, Pac. 784, 
holding· that the injured employee ha·s the right to institute 
proceedings against the negligent third party. The l(ansas 
.Act provides that the employee may take proceeding·s against 
the third party to recover damages and against' any person 
liable to pay compensation under the Act, b·u.t shall not be en-
titled to recover both da1nages and co1npensation. In that 
case the dependents of an employee who was killed by the 
negligence of a third person proceeded to rcover compensa-
tion from the employer and at the same time to maintain an 
action for damages against the third party and the institu-
tion of proceedings to obtain compensation was held to be 
no defense to the action for damages nor could such fact be 
shown by the defendant upon the trial of the action. In the 
opinion the Court says in part: 
"'Vhen one not the employer causes injury to a workma1i, 
it is really nouc of his concern whether the person injured 
has an estate, or has life insurance or accident insurance, 
nor what his contract of employment may be with his em-
ployer; these things neither increase nor decrease his liability. 
To hold otherw-ise would, in a. sense, be to license reckless 
pm·sons negl-igen./ly to 'imj-nre an employee worldng 1tnder the 
Compensat-ion Act ·without liability, thou.gh a. si-milar injury 
to another p(wson wouJd create ri.ab-ility." (Italics ours.) 
The same holding was had in the case of Sfa:mps v. ~fissO'ltri 
P. R. Co., ( 1923), 114 J(ansas 477, 218 Pac.. 1116. 
La.ncasfct· v. liunter, (1919), Tex. Civ. App., 217 S. W. 765, 
construing the 'rexas Act which provides tl1at where an in-
jury for which compensation is payable was caused under 
circumstances creating a. legal liability in some person other 
than the employer, the employee can proceed against sueh 
per Ron for compensation, hut not against both the employer 
and the third party and that if compensation is claimed un-
der the Act, the insurance carrier shall be subrog-ated to the 
insured employee's rights and entitled to reimburse itself 
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and pay the balance to the employee, and holding that under 
said Act, the act of the injured employee in accepting such 
compensation did not copstitute an absolute bar to an action 
against the third person. 
Ilou.ston Electric R. Co. v. Reinle, (1924), Tex. Civ. Ap-
peals, 264 S. \V. 783. 
Harper v. Bernhard (1925), Tex. Civ. Appeals, 268 S. E. 
509. 
P·ittsbttrgh C. C. & St. L. B. Co. v. Parker, Indiana (1921), 
l 9 A. L. R~ ·751, holding that the acceptance of compensation 
under the Indiana Act barred suit by the employee ag·ainst 
third party. The pertinent provisions of the llidiana Act will 
be found set forth on page 755 of the citation of this case, 
and it will there be seen that the Indiana Act expressly pro-
vided for an election on the part of the employee and only 
gives the employer the rig·ht to recover from th third party 
the "indem-nity pa:i(l o·r payable to the inj-ured entployee". 
It will be borne in mind that the Virginia Act makes no 
such provision in respect to the amount recoverable from the 
negligent third party. 
Oones v. P·isher, Ill., (1919), 19 A. L. R. 761, holding that 
under the Illinois Act, which vests a cause of action against 
the third party in either the employer or employee and -gives 
the employee the right of all excess of any recovery over 
and above the amount of compensation received, that either 
the employer or employee could maintain the actio1i and that 
the ·division of the recovery betw~en them is no concern of 
the third party. A very valuable annotation on the subject 
under discussion will be found following this case and like-
wise in 27 A. L. R. 493, 37 A. L. R. 839. 
Lowe v. Mo1·.qan/s L. d~ Tt-. dJ; 8. S. Co., 1922, 1.50 Ln. 90 
So. 429. In this case the Louisiana Act. provided that the 
employee might at his option, either claim compensation un-
der the \Vorkmen 's ·Compensation Act, or obtain damages. 
from or proceed at law against the third party and that if 
compensation were claimed and a warded under the Act, the 
employer having· paid the compensation or having become 
liable therefoi~, should be subrog·ated to the rights of the in-
jured employee to recover against the third person. The 
Court there held that the acceptance of compensation by the 
employee did not bar him from suing the third party, since 
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all the Act did was to give the employer a statutory subro-
gation pro tanto to the rights of the employee. 
Vereek v. Grand Rapids, (1913), 203 ~Iich. 85, 168 N. W .
. 1019, construing the 1\Hchigan Act, which gives the employee 
at his option, the right to accept compensation or to sue the 
third party for damages and deprives him of the right of 
both such procedure and providing that the employer or in-
Rurance carrier might enforce for their respective benefit the 
cause of action ag·ainst the third party, holding that the ac-
ceptance of compensation did not release the third party from 
liability in an action for the benefit of the heirs of the de-
ceased employee. 
Friebel v. Chicago C·ity R. Co., 280 Ill. 76, 117 N. E. 467, 
recognizing the right of the injured employe, after accept-
ing compensation of the master, to sue the independent tort 
feasor, and holding that where the ... 1\.ct vested the right to 
bring such action in the employer, yet: 
.Such right of action was clearly for the use of th einjured 
employee and that in case of insolvency or of the refusal of 
the employer to sue for such damages, it was the rig·ht of 
the injured employee to sue therefor in the name of his em-
ployer, for the empleyee's us and to so collect the same. 
In the case note in 19 A. L. R., page 766, introductory to the 
very valuable annotations on the question it is stated: 
"It may be said, however, at this point, that at least a part 
from au election to proceed under it the Compensation Act, 
according to the weight of authority, does not take away the 
remedy of the employee at common law or u~der another 
statute, against the third person.'' A number of cases are 
there cited in support of this statement. · 
Hotel Equ·ip1nent Co. v. Liddell, Ga., (1924), 124, S. E. 92, 
holding that acceptance or compensation did not bar the em-
ployee's right of action against the third party. The act there 
under construction was similar to section 12 of the Act of 
1918 of this State as pointed out by the Court on page 94 of 
the opinion . 
.Athe·ns Ry. & Electr·ic Co. v. J(inney, Ga., (1925), 127 S. 
~J. 290, to the same effect where action filed by widow of de-
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ceased employee. In this case, page 292 of the opinion, the 
Court says: 
"If, under the act, a widow suing under its provisions were 
given the right to recover as compensation the full value of 
the life of the deceased husband, we should hold, of course, 
that the recovery of that compensation excluded all right to 
recover further compensation against any person. But the 
lVorkm.en's Cmnpensation Act does not 'make JJrovision for 
the ·recovery of the full value of a. life dest·royed by negl·igence 
or otherwise.'' (Italics ours.) 
"But there is no reason for holding that, if another cor-
poration or person other than the employer is g·uilty of negli-
gence which results in injury or death, such corporation or 
person should have the benefit of the act which establishes the 
rate of compensation for injurs' to an employee as against 
an employer, where the employer mid employee have ac-
~epted the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
Like the Georg·ia Act, the Act of this State does not make 
provision for full damages for either injuries or death. 
TVesten1, d!; A. R. R. v. Ilenderson, Ga., (1926), 1.32 S. E. 
645, recognizing right of wido·w of deceased employee who 
had accepted compensation from hnshand's employer to sue 
third party. This case was reversed by a divided Court be-
cause of error in instructions by the lower. Court, hut such 
reversal in no wise impaired the holding as to the righf of the 
"~idow to maintain the suit. 
Book v. Henderson, l(JJ., (1917), 176 Ky. 785, 197 S. W. 
449, holding· that any award to the injured employee is wholly 
immaterial since under tl1e act of that State, the right to 
compensation does not depend upon the question of negligence 
on the part of the e1nployer. 
Travelr>rs Insurance Co·mpany '"· Brass Goods Jl,f.f.q. Co., 
(1925), 239 N.Y. 273, 37 A. L. R .. 826, holding that in a suit 
by the insurance carrier against the negligent third party, 
such carrier is not limited in its reeovery to the amount it 
has paid, hut may recover 'for the full loss caused by t1le in-
jury, although the employee and his dependents eannot share 
in the recovery. This case also holds that under the N e\Y 
York A.ct the ii1jurecl employee is put to an election as to the 
acceptance of compensation, or suit against the third party, 
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and that the election made is final, so that if compensation is 
taken, he has no further interest in the cause of action against 
the wrong-doer. 
The correctness and justice of the Court's ruling is ap-
parent by the references to sections 16 and 22 o£ the New 
'York Act found on page 829 of the A. L. U., report of this 
case; under these sections it appears, the amou.nt of the award 
of compe1tsatio·n is not definitely fixed, after so stating the 
Court says: 
''So as to what amount will be ultimately required we can 
but guess. It may be more or it may he less than the award 
of damages which the carrier may receive.'' 
Compare these provisions fixing no limit on the amount 
of compensation nuder the New York Act, with the provi-
sions of section 30 of the Virg·inia Act limiting compensa-
tion in any case to the maximum an1ount of $4,500.00, Michie, 
1887 (30), and the reasoning of the Court in the New York 
case becomes authority for tl1e c.ontention of plaintiff in the 
instant case. 
Authorities from other states might he furthei· multiplied 
with, it is thought but scant additional aid in the determina-
tion of the question presented under the 1924 amendment to 
section 12 of the Act of this State. 
The intention of the legislature as to the remedial and 
beneficient purposes of the Act of this Statr3 is manife::;t from 
the caption to the original enactment, Act 1918, page 637. 
There is no contention manifested in the act to take away 
from the injured servant a11y rights theretofore existi11g·. 
The right to sue the independent tort fea.sor existed at com-
mon la-w and was not, we submit, intended to be destroyed by 
the advantages given the employee solely against his em-
ployer under the Compensation Act. 
The assignment of the rig-ht of action against the third 
party to the employer or. insurance carrier as the case m.ay 
he is intended solely for the honefit of tl1e employer and In-
snrnnee carrier as the case mig·l1t be and the benefit of the 
injured employe and not for the benefit of the negligent third 
party. 
The s1tb1'ogat-ion of the employer or insurance carrier as 
the case majr be to the right <:>f the employee accepting an 
award against the third party is for their benefit and the 
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benefit of the injured employee and not for the benefit of the 
negligent third party. 
'l'he consideration for such assig·nm.ent and subrogation is 
the award paid or the liability for the payment of 'vhich is 
assumed and the negligent third party is not a party to or 
interested in the slightest manner therein beyond legal as-
surance that any recovery against him or it; is received by 
the parties thereto entitled, which the defendant has in the 
instant case. 
The purpose of the amendment 'vas to provide, that so far 
as the employer aud his insurance c~rrier are concerned, 
the injured employee could not first recover co1npen-sat~ion 
and Jhen recover damages from the third party, thereby se-
curing two payments for one wrong. The amendment .prop-
erly prevents this. It provides: 
(a) If the injured employee reco_vers a jndgment for dam-
ages against the third party he cannot ask compensation. 
(b) If he accept the award, he assigns by so doing, his right 
of action to. his employer or insurance carrier as the case 
may be, which in turn is subrogated to the extent ofthe award 
only to his rights, and may file action either in their respec-
tive name or_ in the name of the injured employee, but for 
their joint use and benefit. All sums recovered over and 
above the award and reasonable counsel fees to be paid to 
the employee, etc. 
Such provisions are clearly not intended to rob the in-
jured employer of all interest in the right of action against 
the neglig·ent third party, and to prevent him, as in the in-
stant case, from filing action for the use and benefit of him-
self, his employer and the insurance carrier when they have 
each failed to so do. It may be justly observed that there is 
no duty on the part of either the employer or the insurance 
carrier to hazard the cost of an action which might or might 
not be successful for the benefit of the employee who has re-
ceived au award of compensation. 
It may be with equal fairness observed that they have no 
right by neglecting to file such proceedings to bar such ac-
tion by the injured employee, when, as in the instant case, 
their rig·hts in any recovery, are amply protected. 
As hereinbefore stated, we have considered the sundry as-
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signments of error jointly in the discussion thereof and in 
conclusion, we respectfully submit: 
(1) That the acceptance by plaintiff of compensation does 
not bar the right of action against the defendant. 
(2) That plaintiff's motion to strike out and reject the 
special plea filed by defendant should have been granted. 
(3) That the lower Court should have admitted and con-
sidered the evidence offered for and in behalf of plaintiff. 
( 4) That the evidence offered under the special plea for 
and in behalf of defendant \vas incompetent, irrelevant and 
immaterial and that plaintiff's motion to exclude the same 
should have ·been sustained. 
( 5) That plaintiff's motions for the ascertainment of his 
damages as established by the evidence in his behalf and for 
the entry of a final judgment in his behalf and for the use 
and benefit of himself, his employer, the Fruit Growers Ex-
press and its insurance carrier, the Travellers Insurance Com-
pany, as their respective interests might be ascertained, 
should have been granted and judgment so entered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOSEPH HORSM!,.N, 
Suing for the use and benefit of the Fruit Grow-
ers Express and Travellers Insurance Co., and 
himself as their respective interests may be 
shown, Plaintiff, 
By R. II. YEATMAN, 
WILSON M. F ARR, 
Counsel. 
· We, the undersigned counsel, practising in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virg·inia, do hereby certify that in our 
opinion, there is error in the judgment of the Circuit Court 
for Arlington County, Virginia, entered ~anuary 4, 1929,. in 
the above entitled case as above complained of, for whiCh 
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the same should be reviewed and final judgment on the merits 
entered in behalf of petitionr. 
Heceived June 18, 1929. 
R. I-I. YEAT:fifAN, 
vVILSON 11. F ARR. 
H. S. J. 
\Vrit of error allow·ed; supersedeas awarded. Bond $300. 
ROBERT R. PRENTIS. 
Received ·June 26, 192R 
H. S. J. 
In the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of Arlington 
· County, Virginia_. 
TR.ANSCRIPT OF RECOR-D IN THE OASE OF 
.Joseph Horsman, Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad Company, 
a Corporation, Defendant. 
Action of Trespass on the Case. 
Commonwrealth of ·virginia. 
To the Sheriff of Arlington County, Greeting: 
'V"E 001\fi\f.AND YOU TO SU1fi\tfON The Richmond, 
Fredericksburg and Potomac R.ailroad Company, a Corpora-
tion, if it be found within your bailiwick to appear at the 
Clerk's Office of our Circuit Court of our said County of 
Arlington, at the Rules to be holden for said Court, on the 
third ~fonda.y in December, next, to answer .Joseph Iforsman 
in an Action of Trespass on the Case-Damages $75,000.00, 
and have then and there this writ. 
\Vitness, Wm. H. Duncan, Clerk of our said Court, at the 
Court Ifouse of said County, the 8th day of December, 1925, 
and in the 150th year of the Commonwealt~1. 
A Copy-Teste: 
\V1f. H. DUNCAN, Clerk. 
By R. E. R.E,J\llNGTON, 
Deputy Clerk. 
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page 2 } In the Circuit ·Court for Arlington County, Virginia. 
Filed 12/8/25. 
Joseph Horsman, Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad Company a 
Corporation, Defendant. .. ' 
At Law, No. 
This action filed by plaintiff Joseph Horsman is for the 
use and benefit of the Fruit Growers Express and the Trav-
ellers Insurance Company and the plaintiff Joseph Hors-
man as their respective interests may be shown. 
J 
JOS'EPH I-IORSl\iAN, Pltff. 
By Counsel. 
FIR.ST COUNT. 
The plaintiff, Joseph Horsman, sues the defendant, Rich-
mond, ],redericksburg & Potomac Railroad ·company, a cor-
poration, for t11at at and before the happening of the griev-
ances hereinafter set forth, the said defendant was engaged 
in the railroad business, operating cars propelled by locomo-
tives for the carriage of passengers and freight in the State 
of Virginia; and for that the ·said defendant, in the conduct of 
its said business, used tracks laid in what is lalO"\Vn as Po-
tomac Yards, in said State of ·virginia, for the purpose of op-
erating thereqn and therein its locomotives and engines, some 
of which are commonly known as shifting engines, for the 
purpose of hauling and pulling passenger coaches, freight, 
express and ·other kinds of cars into and out of said yards, 
and moving and shifting said coaches, freig·ht, express and 
other kinds of cars in and about said Potomac Yards and also 
for the purpose of operating, hauling and pulling therein its 
own coaches, freight, express and other kinds of cars; and 
for that at and before the happening of the grievances here-
inafter set forth, tJ1e Fruit Growers J~xpress had the right 
and privilege and did maintain in said Potomac Yards an 
office for the purpose of conducting its business and also had 
the right and privilege to use and did use tracks laid in said 
-----~-------- -- --~~ --
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Yards, part of which were known as a siding and 
page 3 ~ also part of which were known as advance tracks, 
and from time to time the said Fruit Growers Ex-
press, in the conduct of its business, caused to be placed in 
and to remain stationary and to be hauled into and out of 
said Yards freight, express, refrigerating and other kinds of 
cars; and for that at and before the happening of thH griev-
ances hereinafter set forth, the plaintiff was employed by 
the said Fruit Growers Express as a painter, the duties as-
signed to him consisting of painting· and touching up freight, 
express, refrigerating and other cars used by the said Fruit 
Growers Express brought into said Potomac Yards and per-
mitted to 1·emain therein upon the tracks as aforesaid and 
for that in the performance of his duties as such painter, it 
became necessary for the plaihtiff to go in and about said 
cars, as well as ·zMzde the same; and for that the defendant 
C·Orporation, throug·h its agents, servants and employes, 
knew or by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence 
'vould have known that it was the practice and custom of the 
said Fruit Growers Express, acting throug·h its agent, and 
particularly through the plaintiff, to paint and touch up the 
said cars used by it while standing in and upon said tracks 
and in that connection for the ·plaintiff as such painter to go 
in and about said cars and under the same when they are 
stationary; and for that on, to-wit, the lOth day of Decem-
ber, A. D. 1924, the plaintiff, while employed by the said 
Fruit Growers Express, as a painter, was directed by the 
said Fruit Growers Express, acting through its representa-
tive, to do some painting· and touching up on some cars which 
were stationary upon what is known as advance tracks in said 
Yards, ~nd 'vhich had been standing thereon for a long period 
of time prior thereto, there being about twenty-five or more of 
said cars coupled together; and for that the plaintiff, in pur-
suance of the said directions of his said employer, went to 
the said string of cars with the implements necessary for him 
to perform the work so assigned to him and observ-
page 4 ~ iug that the said cars were at a standstill and that 
no engine or locomoti've was attached thereto which 
might in any way move the said cars or in any way render 
his working in and about the same dangerous, proceeded un-
der one of the said cars for the purpose of passing from one 
side to the other, when the said cars were at a ·standstill as 
aforesaid, proceeding from the east to the 'vest side thereof: 
and the plaintiff says that it then and there became and was 
the duty of the said defendant, in the operation of its locomo-
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tives and engines in and upon the tracks whereon the afore-
said cars were standing, to use reasonable care and prudence 
so as not to injure the plaintiff while in the performance of 
his duties as aforesaid, yet notwithstanding its duty in the 
premises, on the day and year aforesaid, the said defendant, 
acting through its agent, servant and employee, operating 
and in charge of one of its said locomotives or engines, neg-
ligently and carelessly caused said locomotive or engine to 
run into, collide with and strike the said string of cars caus-
ing the same to be moved, 'vithout g·iving due and timely warn-
ing or notice of its intention so to do to the plaintiff, and 
negligently and carelessly failed and omitted to take proper 
precautions to ascertain whether or not it was proper to 
move or run into or collide with said string of c-ars without 
injuring plaintiff, and negligently and carelessly failed and 
omitted to make due and proper inspection to ascertain 
whether or not the said cars were ready for moving from the 
place where they were at a standstill with due safety to plain-
tiff and others who might be lawfully in and about the same, 
and negligently and carelessly failed and omitted to keep 
said locomotive or engine under proper control so as to 
avoid running into and colliding with said string of cars, 
· and negligently and carelessly failed and omitted to keep a 
proper lookout, whereby and by reason whereof the said lo-
comotive or engine was negligently and carelessly propelled 
as aforesaid against the said string· of cars causing the said 
string of cars to be moved, while the plaintiff's 
page 5 } hands were upon the west rail of said track and the 
wheels of said car ntn to over the hands and fore-
arms. of the plaintiff. ..c\.nd the plaintiff says that by reason $ 
of the negligence of the defendant as aforesaid, his hands 
and forearms \Vere so badly mashed and crushed that both of 
his hands ·and forearms had to be amputated below the el-
bows and he has thereby lost his said hands and part of his 
said forearms and he also has received a severe shock to his 
nervous system which has rendered him permanently nervous, 
all of which caused him to suffer and he will continue to 
suffer great pain and mental anguish, and plaintiff was oth-
erwise rendered s.ick, sore, lame and disordered. And plain-
tiff further says that by reason of the negligence of the de-
fendant as aforesaid, and the injuries received by him, he has 
been and 'vill permanently ~e incapacitated from performing 
any work as a result of which he has lost and will continue to 
lose until the time of his death the emoluments that other-
wise would acc.rue to him :from his employment with the said 
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Fruit Growers Express, and in any other capacity, and further 
by reason of the negligence and injuries aforesaid plaintiff 
l1as been compelled to lay out and expend and will from tin1c 
to time in the future be compelled to l~y out and expend 
large sums of moneys for medicines, medical attention and 
otherwise in and about an endeavor to be healed and cured 
of his injuries aforesaid. 
vVHER-Eli"'OR.E, plaintiff brings this suit and claims the 
sum of Seventy-five Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00) damages, 
besides costs. 
SECOND COUNT. 
The plaint~ff, Joseph Iforsman, further sues the defendant, 
Richmond, Fredericksburg- & Potomac Railroad Company, a 
corporation, for that at and before the happening of the griev-
ances hereinafter set forth, the said defendant was engaged 
in the railroad business, operating in interstate commerce 
cars propelled by locomotives for the carriag·e of 
page 6 ~ passengers and freig·ht; and for that the said de-
fendant; in the conduct of its said business, used 
tracks laid in what is known ns Potomac ·y;ards, in thP Stnte 
of Virginia, for the purpose of operating thereon and therein 
its locomotives and engines, some of which are commonly 
known as shifting engines, for the purpose of hauling and 
pulling passenger coaches, freight, express and other kinds 
of cars used in interstate commerce into and out of said· 
~ Yards, and moving and shifting said coaches, freight, ex-
press and other kinds of cars in and about said Potomac 
Yards, and also for the purpose of operating, hauling -and 
pulling therein its own coaches, freight, express and other 
kinds of cars used in interstate commerce; and for that at and 
before the happening of the grievances hereinafter set forth, 
the Fruit Growers Express had the right ancl privileg·e and 
did maintain in said Potomac Yards an of.ffce for the purpose 
of conducting its business and also h~td the right ·and pl·ivi-
leg-e to use and did usc tracks laid in said Yards, part of 
which were known as a siding and also part of which were 
. known as advance tracks, and from time to time, the said 
Fruit Growers Express, in the conduct of its business, cauRed 
to be placed in and to remah1 stationary and to be hauled 
into and out of said Y,ards freight, express, refrigerating and 
other kinds of cars used by it in interstate commerce; and 
for that at and before the happening of the grievances Jwre-
inaftcr set forth, the plaintiff was employed by· the said Fruit 
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Growers Express, as a painter, the duties assigned to him 
consisting of painting and touching up freight, express, re-
frigerating and other cars used by the said Fruit Growers 
Express, in interstate commerce, brought into said Potomac 
Yards and permitted to remain therein upon the tracks as 
aforesaid; and for that in the performance of his duties as 
such painter, it became necessary for the plaintiff to go in 
and about said cars, as well as under the same; and for that 
the defendant corporation, throug·h its agents, servants and 
employees, knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care and 
prudence would have known that it was the practice 
page 7 ~ and custom of the said Fruit Growers Express, act-
ing throug·h its agent, and particularly through the 
plaintiff, to paint and touch up the said cars used by it while 
standing in and upon said tracks and in that connection 'vith 
the plaintiff as such painter to go in and about said cars 
under the same when they were stationary; and for that on, 
to-wit, the lOth day of December, A. D. 1924, the plaintiff, 
while employed by the said Fruit Growers Express, as a 
painter, was directed by the said Fruit Growers Express, 
acting through its representative, to do some painting and 
touching· up on some cars which were stationary upon what 
is kno,vn as advance tracks in said Yards, and which had been 
standing thereon for a long· period of time prior thereto, 
there being about twenty-five or more of said cars coupled to-
gether which said cars 'vere being used in interstate com-
merce; and for that the plninti:ff, in pursuance of the said 
directions of his said employer, went to the said string of cars 
·with the implements necessary for him to perform the work 
so assig·ned to him and observing that the said cars were at 
a standstill and that no locomotive or engine was attached 
thereto which might in any way move the said cars or in any 
way render his working in and about the same dangerous, 
proceeded under one of the said cars for the purpose of pass-
ing from one side to the other, when the said cars were at a 
standstill as aforesaid, proceeding from the east to the west 
side thereof; and the plaintiff says that it then and there 
became and was the duty of the said defendant, in the opera-
tion of its locomotives and engines in and upon the tracts 
w·hereon the said cars were standing, to use reasonable cflre 
and prudence so a~ 11 ot to injure the plaintiff while in the 
performance of his duties as aforesaid, yet notwithstanding 
its duties in the premises, on the day and year aforesaid, the 
said defendant, acting through its agent, servant or employee, 
operating and in charge of one of its said locomotives or en-
gines, neg·ligently and carelessly caused said locomotive or 
28 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
engine to run into, collide with and strike the said string 
of cars causing the same to be moved, without giv-
page 8 ~ ing due and timely warning· or notice of its intention 
so to do to the plaintiff, and negligently and care-
lessly faile and omitted to take precautions to ascertain 
'vhether or not it was proper to move or run into or collide 
with said string of cars without injuring plaintiff, and neg-
ligently and carelessly failed and omi ttecl to make due and 
pro1Je i.p.spection to acertai·rt whether or not the said cars 
were ready for moving from the place where they were at 
a standstill with due safety to plaintiff and others who might 
be la,vfully in and about the same, and negligently and care-
lessly failed and omitted to keep said locomotive or engine 
under proper control so as to avoid running into and collid-
ing with said string· of cars, and n~gligently and carelessly 
failed and omitted to keep a proper lookout, whereby and by 
reason whereof the said locomotive or engine was negligently 
and carelessly propelled as aforesaid against the said string 
of cars causing the said string of cars to be moved, while the 
plaintiff's hands were upon the west rail of said track and the 
'vheels of said car to run over the hands and forearms of the 
plaintiff. And the plaintiff says that by reason of the neg-
ligence of the defendant aforesaid, his hands and forearms 
were so badly mashed and crushed that both of his hands and 
forearms had to be amputated below the. elbows and he ha~ 
thereby lost his said hands and a part o£ his said forearms 
and he also received a severe shock to his nervous system, 
which has rendered him permanently nervous, all of which 
caused him to suffer and he will continue to suffer gTeat pain 
and mental anguish, and plaintiff was other,vise rendered 
sick, sore, lame and disonled. And plaintiff further says that 
by reason of the negligence of the defenc~ant as aforesaid, 
and the injuries received by him, he has been and 'vill per-
manently be incapacitated from performing any 'vork as a 
result of which he has lost and will continue to lose until the 
time of his death the emoluments that otherwise would ac-
crue to him from his employment 'vith the said 
page 9 ~ Fruit Growers Express, and in any 9ther capacity, 
and further by reason of the negligence and in-
juries aforesaid, plaintiff has been compelled to lay out and 
expend and will from time to time in the future be com-
pelled to lay out and expend large sums of moneys for medi-
cines, medical attention and otherwjse in and about an en-
deavor to be healed and cured of his injuries aforesaid. 
WIIER.EFQR.E, plaintiff brings this suit and claims the 
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further sum of Seventy-five Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00) 
damages, besides costs. 
\VILSON ~L F ARR., 
'VILTON J. LA~IBERT, 
R. H. YEATMAN, 
Of Counsel. 
Attorneys for Pl~intiff. 
page 10 ~ In the Circuit Court for Arlington County, 
Virginia. 
Filed 2/15/26. 
J·oseph Horsman, Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railrqad Company, 
Defendant. 
At Law,# 
And now comes the defendant, the Richmond, Fredericks-
burg & Potomac Rai~road Company, says that the plaintiff 
is not entitled to maintain or to prosecute this suit because, 
as is shown in the declaration, the said plaintiff was em-
ployed by the Fruit Growers Express, which is not a part of 
and which is in no way connected with the said defendant, 
and which is not owned, controlled or operated by the said 
defendant. 
And the defendant further states ·that the said Fruit Grow-
ers Express carried workman's compensation insurance in 
accordance 'vith the provisions of the statutes of the State 
of Virginia in such cases made and provided; that after the 
accident to the plaintiff, as set forth in the declaration filed 
in this cause, la.,vful claim was made by the plaintiff against 
his. employer, the :B-,ruit Growers Express, that the Insur-
ance Company assumed the liability of the employer by rea-
son of said accident, and has paid and is no'v paying to the 
plaintiff the compensation due to him under the provisions 
of the statutes of the State of Virginia, and that under the 
statutes of the State of Virg·inia in such cases made and pro-
vided, the employer, namely, the Fruit Growers Express, or 
its insurance carrier, by operation of law becomes the as-
signee of any right to recover damages which the injured 
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employee may have against any other party for such in-
jury. 
And the said defendant further says that by the express 
terms of the statutes of the State of Virginia in 
page 11 ~ such cases made and provided, and by decision of 
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia con-
struing such statutes, the plaintiff is not entitled to prose- . 
cute this suit which the defendant prays may be forthwith 
dismissed. 
RICHl\:IOND, FREDERICI{SBURG & POTO~IAC 
- RAILROAD 001\IP ANY 
By GARDNER. L. BOOTI-IE, Counsel. 
page 12 ~ In the Circuit Court for A.rlington County, 
Virginia. 
Filed 4/L9/26. 
Joseph liorsm:tn, Plaintiff, 
vs. 
R.ichmond, lilredcrickshurg & Potomac Hailroad Company, 
a Corporation, Defendant. 
At Law. 
~·fotion of plaintiff to strike out the plea filed by the de-
fendant. 
Now comes the plaintiff, .Joseph llorsman, and moves to 
strike out the plea filed by the defendant, and assigns iLe fol-
1 o,·dng grounds of said motion: 
1: If said plea he regarded as a special plea, and dilatory 
in nature, it is bad on the ground of duplicity. 
2: If said plea be regarded as a special plea, and dilatory 
in character, it is had in form, as it introduces new matter 
and docs not conclude with verification. 
3: Because the matters set up in said plea do not consti-
tute any defense to this action, as the plaintiff is entitled to 
maintain the same against the defendant as an independent 
to'rt feasor for the injuries occasioned plaintiff by reason of 
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the sole negligence of the defendant, proximately causino· 
the injuries to plaintiff in the way and manner set forth i~ 
the. declaration heretofore filed. 
JOSEPII HORS~l.Al:'f, 
WILTON J. LAl\ffiERT, 
R.UDOLPB: II. YEATMAN, 
WILSON 1\L F ARR, 
Attys. for Pltff. 
Ry Counsel. 
page 13 ~ In the Circuit Court of Arlington Count.v, 
Virginia. · 
Filed Oct. 18, 1926. 
Joseph Horsman, Plain ti if. 
vs. 
Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad Company, 
Defendant. 
At Law# 
The defendant, the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac 
Railroad Company, says : 
That the plaintiff is not entitled to maintain or to prose-
cute this action against it because, as appears from th(;\ 
declaration heretofore filed by the plaintiff, the said plaintiff 
was employed by the Fruit Growers Express, which is not a 
part of and which is not in any way connected with the said 
defendant and which is not owned, controlled or operated . 
by the said defendant. 
And the defendant further says, that the said Fruit Grow, 
ers E:\.'"Press carried \Vorkmen's Compensation Insurance, in 
accordance with the provisions of the statutes of the State 
of Virginia in such cases made and provided. 
That after the accident to th~ plaintiff, as set forth in 
the declaration heretofore filed in this cause, lawful claim 
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was made by the plaintiff against his employer the Fruit 
Growers Express, that the Travelers Insurance Company as~ 
sumed the liability of the employer by reason of said acci-
dent, and that it has paid and is now paying to .the plaintiff 
the compensation due to him under the provisions of the 
statutes of the State of Virginia, as will appear from a cer .. 
tified copy of the record in Claim #53332 before the Indus-
trial· Commission of Virginia, Joseph Horsman, Claimant, 
vs. Fruit Growers Express Company, Employer, and Trav-
elers Insurance ·Company, Insurance Carrier, 
page 14 ~ heretofore annexed'· to and made a part of this 
plea. 
And the defendant further says that under the statutes 
of the State of Virginia in such cases made and provided, the 
employer, namely, the Fruit Growers Express, or its Insur-
ance Carrier, by operation of law becomes the assignee of 
any right to recover damages which the injured employee 
may have against any other party for such injury. 
And the said defendant further says, that by the express 
terms of Sub-Section 12 of Section 1887, Virginia Code of 
1924, the plaintiff is not entitled to prosecute this suit or 
cause of action, and this the defendant is ready to verify. 
RIOH~fOND, FR.EDERICI{;SBURG & POTOMAC 
R·AILROAD COMPANY. 
By GARDNER L. BOOTHE, Counsel. 
·State .of Virginia, 
City of Alexandria, to-wit: 
Personally appeared before the undersigned Notary Publi~ 
in and for the State and City aforesaid, Gardner I.J. Boothe, 
who made oath in due form of law that he is Counsel for 
the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad Com-
pany, and that the statements contained in the foregoing plea 
are true to the best of his knowledge and belief. 
Given under my hand this 16th day of October, 1926. 
~fy commission as Notary expires January 11, 1930. 
GLADYS M. BR.OOKE, 
Notary Public. 
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page 15 } The use of this Form is required under the pro-
visions of the W orkm~n 's Compensation Act. 
BOLLING H. HANDY, Chairman 
C. G. KIZER 
PARKER P. DEANS 
INDUSTRIAL CO~I~IISSION OF VIRGINIA. 
RICHMOND. 
B-551395 
F:~:uit Growers Express 
Company 
re-J oseph Horsman 
W. F. BUR.SEY, Secretary. 
Claim No ............... . 
Case of Joseph Horsman 
Carrier Travelers Insurance Co. 
~IEMORANDlTM: OF AGREEl\IENT AS TO 
P AYlVIENT OF COlVIPENSATION 
' Examined by 
N ote.-This agreement when executed shall be filed 
promptly by the employer with the Commission. It should 
be sent by mail. 
Note.-This agreement is subject to approval by the Com-
mission and must provide for the payment and receipt of 
compensation strictly in accordance with law. 
'V e, Joseph Horsman, 506 S. Patrick St., Alexandria, Va. 
(Name of injured employee) (Address) Age 20 
and Fruit Growers Express Co., Alexandria, Va. 
(Name of employer) (Address) 
have reached an ag-reement for the payment of compensation 
for the accidental injury sustained by said employee, and 
submit this memorandum of such agreement. We agree that 
the facts herein stated and the amounts to be paid are in 
strict accordance with the Compensation Law; and we fur-
ther agree to. receive and. to pay .compensation and such other 
amounts as may be determined from the nature, extent, dura-
tion and result of the injury described herein. 
·----------------
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1. Said injury was sustained on 12-10-24, 19 .... 
Employee quit work on 12-10-24, 19 .... 
" 2. Was employee paid full w·ages for the entire day on 
which he quit work f No. 
3. Address where accident happened. Alexandria, .Va. 
. 4. Nature of injury, Crushed and lacerated torn right and 
left hands-fracture of ulner .and radius of both forearms-
Necessary to amputate both hands at 'vrist. 
5. How accident happened? In attempting to cross track 
after stencilling car, placed both hands on rail, at which time 
engine coupled to cars and ran car truck over both hands. 
6. \Vhat was employee doing at time of injury? regular 
duties (painter). . 
7. Employee's average w·eekly wages (including substantial 
perquisites, such as overtime, free rents, etc.) $24.00. 
8. Physician's estimate of total disability from date of 
accident ..... weeks and .......... clays. 
9. Nature of disability 
(Temporary total) 
(Temporary partial) Permanent total. 
(Permanent total) 
(Permanent partial) 
pag·e 16 ~ 10. Did employee suffer loss of a member or loss 
of use of a member ( S'ee Section 32 of Law) Yes. 
11. Describe accurately the location of point of severance 
of memher or the exact extent of loss of use. Loss of both 
hands above wrist. 
12. Did employer furnish medical services? Yes. 
13. Name of physician, Dr. W. A. \Varfield, Address Alex-
andria, \T a. Dr. Delaney, ·Address Alexandria, V-a. · 
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14. Terms of Agreement as to Compensation: 
$12.00 per week, beginning 12-10-24, 19 .... 
(a) to be u~od !?r. temporary unless disability 
bl total d1sabihhes ( xce t s Jecific !
(a) .... during disability, l 
paya e (b) evel'y 2 weeks for 375 weeks, e d PS I 39) 
(b) t b d f 'fi d' un er ec. aJ o e use or speCl c IS-
abilities . .Sec. 32. 
shall continue for more than 42 days from the day of accident 
(including the day of accident), in which event compensation 
will be paid for the entire period of disability, AND all costs 
of medical, surgic.al and hospital attention and supplies dur-
ing the first 60 days after the accident. Tl1e employer has re-
funded to the employee the sum of $ .......... , by him ex-
pended within the said 60 days for the attention and supplies 
above allowed. 
15. Has employee returned to work? ........ With whom? 
........ 1Vhen "J • ••••••• At what 'vages ~ $ ....... . 
16. Nature of employer's business 
17. In what insurance company is employer insured~ The 
Travelers Insurance: Co. 
Dated at Alexandria, Va., this 10 day of Dec., 19 .... 
Signed in the presence of: 
'\7itness ................ . 
Address ............. . 
Employer, Fruit Growers Express Co. 
By Travelers Insurance Co. 
(Official Ti tie) 
his 
Employee, Joseph X Horsman 
mark 
\Vitness, Charles Henry Smith, 
Address, 123 So. Royal St., 
Alexandria, Va. 
Note.-Every question must he answered. Repor.t must 
be signed by employer or his duly authorized agent. The 
36 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia ... 
Commission. will not accept copies of reports or .reports signed 
on typewriter. 
page 17 ~ The use of this Form is required· under the pro-
·: visions of the Workmen's Compensation.Act. 




BOLLING H. HANDY, Chairman 
C. G. KIZER 
·PARI(E P. DEANS' 
W. F. BURSE·Y, Secretary. 
Claim No. 5332. 
·Case of Joseph Horsman 
NOTICE OF A vV AR.D · 
(APPROVAL OF AGREEMENT) 
Date, January 6, .1925. 
To Fruit Growers Express Company, (Employ~r) 
Alerandria, Virginia. 
and · Joseph Horsman, (Employee) 
506 S. Patrick St., Alexandria, Va. 
·and Travelers Insurance Company, (Insurance Carrier) 
801 Mutual Building, 




Take notice that. the Industrial Commission of Virginia 
has examined the memorandum of .agreement described above 
and entered into Dec. 10, 1924, for the payment of compen-
sation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and in ac-
cordance with the provisions of said Act has approved the 
same a~ follows: 
.. 
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·· $12:00 per week for 375 weeks, payable every 2 weeks, be-
ginning December -10, 1924.· .. ·· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
If any ·party in interest doubts that the agreement made 
has been made strictly -according: to law, he may address the 
Commission with an inquiry or com:Qlaint. It will receive 
prompt attention. · · · - - · 
Yours truly ..... _., 
INDUSTRIAL C01vi1\tiiSSION OF VIRGINIA, 
-BOLLING H./HANDY, Chairman. 
Attest: 
W. F. Bursey, Secretary. 
Form No. 9-4-21-26-5M . 
.INDUSTRIAL· COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA. 
pag.a 18. ~ . RICHMOND 
BOLLING ·H. HANDY,. Chairman 
C. G. KIZER 
PARKE P. DEANS' 
W. F. BURSEY, Secretary. 
Claim No. 5332 
Case of Joseph Horsman 
NOTICE OF A WARD 
Da~e February 4, 1925. 
To Fruit Growers- Express Company, (Employer) 
Alexandria, Virginia. 
: I 
and Joseph Horman, (Employee) 
506 S. Patrick Street, Alexandria, Va. 
and Travelers Insurance Company, (Insurance Carrier) 
Richmond, Virginia. 
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Whereas, the Industrial Commission of Virginia did on 
January 6, 1925, make an award of compensation in the above 
styled case as follows: 
$12.00 per week for 375 weeks, payable every two weeks~ 
beginning December 10, 1924, and 
vVhereas, it appears that the claimant was represented by 
an attorney in the case, and request has been made to this 
Commi~~~on to fix an attorney's fee, 
Now, therefore, take notice that after a careful considera-
tion of the circumstances an allowance of $50.00 is made in 
favor of Charles Henry Smith, Attorney at Law, Alexan-
dria, Virginia, as a fee for the services rendered, ·and the 
employer is directed to pay to ·charles I-Ienry Smith the sum 
9f $5~.00 and to deduct same from the compensation awarded. 
Attest: 
INDUSTRIAL CO~ilVIISSION OF VIRGINIA, 
BOLLING H. HANDY, Chairman. 
W. F. Bursey, Secretary. 






BOLLING H. HANDY, Chairman 
C. G. l{IZER-
PARI{E P. DE·ANS 
W. F. BURSEY, .Secretary 
State of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, to-wit: 
I, W. F. Bursey, Secretary of the Industrial. Commission 
of Virginia, do hereby certify that the foregoing are true 
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and correct copies of the findings of fact and other matters 
pertinent to the questions at issue in .Claim No. 53332, Joseph 
·Horsman, Claimant, versus Fruit Growers Express Com-
pany, Employer, and Travelers Insurance Company, Insur-
ance Carrier, as t11e same appear of record in this office. 
Given under my hand and the seal of the Industrial Com-
mission of Virginia, this the 18th day of June, 1926. 
W. F. BURS'E·Y, Secretary, 
Industrial Commission of Virginia. 
Industrial Commission of 
Virg·inia Seal. 
page 20 } In the Circuit Court for Arlington County, 
Virginia. 
Filed 4/22/27. 
Joseph Horsman, Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad Company, a 
Corporation, Defendant. · 
At Law. 
~1:otion of plaintiff to strike out the amended plea filed by 
the defendant. 
Now comes the plaintiff, Joseph Horsman, and moves to 
strike out the plea filed by the defendant, and assigns the 
following grounds of said motion: 
1 : If said. plea be regarded as a special plea, and dilatory 
in nature, it is bad on . .the ·gr'ound of: dilplicity. 
2: Because the matters set up in said plea do not consti-
tute any defense to this action, as the plaintiff is entitled to 
maintain tlie same against the defendant as an independent 
tort feasor for. the injuries occasioned plaintiff by reason of 
the sole negligence of the defendant, proximately causing the 
injuries to plaintiff in the way and manner set forth in the 
declaration heretofore filed. 
3: The liability of defendant as an independent tort feasor 
- \ 
. . 
40 Supreme Court· of :Appeals- of -Virginia. 
may. be enforced, by an action instituted ·in -the name of plain-
tiff; the Workman's .Compensation Act of the State of Vir-
ginia expressly 'reserves rights. of . action against an inde-
pendent. tort fea.sor and vests plaintiff 'vith an interest in 
the right to bring suit, to prosecute the same and to receive 
the proceeds of any collection in said suit without any re-
sponsil?ility to:wards defendant in .the disposition of any re-
covery. thereby- made ,and had; the statute in question was 
·. not enacted for the· benefit of defendant herein, 
page 21 ~ which, under the. law, ·is liable for the entire a:r;nount 
of such damage~ as_may be lawfully recovered of 
it in these proceedings. 
JOSEPH HQRSM.AN, -Plaintiff. 
By :R. H. YEATMAN, 
· WlLSON ~L FARR, 
His Attorneys .. 
. . .. • 
11age 22 } At a Circuit Court for the County of Arlington, 
Virginia, continued and. held ·at· the Court House 
thereof at 10 o'clock A. M. Monday, ~Tnly the 11th, in the 
year: of our Lor<il, Nineteen Hundred and Twenty-seven .. 
Present: The lion. Sam '1 G. Brent; Judge. 
Joseph Horsman, Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Ri~hmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad Company, 
Defendant. · · 
• I ' 
·At Law.# 
. . l 
This day came the parties by their Attorneys, and the 
· plaint~ff having heretofore filed a motion to strike out -the 
anre!ld.ed plea fil~d by ·the defeJ?.dant, · a~d t~e- ·de.f~~d-a~~ ha~~·· 
ing moved that said motion to strike out said ·amended p'lea 
be' overruled,· and the· :Court having heretof-ore heard ·argu-_ 
ments of counsel on said motions, and being of the ·opinion 
that the said amended plea of the defendant. con~t~tutes a: 
good and valid defense_ and a bar to the·aforesaid ~ction if: 
the facts alleged therein under ea.th. are true, . it ·is adjudged 
and ordered that the motion of the plaintiff to strike out said 
amended plea of the defendant be and the same is hereby 
overruled, to which ruling of. the Court the Plaintiff by his 
counsel excepted; and this matter is now continued with leave 
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granted to plaintiff to file such additional pleadings as he 
may desire. 
SA~I'L G. BRENT, Judge. 
page 23 } In the Circuit Court for Arlington County; 
Virginia. 
Filed Feb. 20, 1928. 
Joseph Horsman, Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad Company, 
Defendant. 
At Law. 
The said plaintiff, by his attorneys, comes and says that 
. by reason of anything by the said defendant in his plea al-
leged, this action ought not to be dismissed, because he says 
the matters so set up in the said plea do not constitute a de-. 
fflnse against plaintiff's eause of action and cannot be relied 
upon by defendant as a defense ana bar thereto; that de-
fenda_nt is an independent tort jeas01· and as such negligently 
committed the grievance on the day and year and in the way 
and manner set forth in the declaration filed herein as the 
proximate result whereof plaintiff suEttained the injuries al-
leged and complained of, that the statute law of this S'tate 
enacted for the sole benefit of the ·master and servant elect-
ing to operate thereunder is not for the benefit of an inde-
pendent tort feasor.and that by the express terms of the Act 
the rights of the injured servant in any recovery against the 
independent tort .fea.sor a;re expressly reserved and protected 
and by necessity the right is conferred upon such servant, 
including plaintiff herein, to file and prosecute an action 
against the independent tort feasor for damages occasioned 
him, and such right is preserved by said .Act to the injured 
servant; including plaintiff herein, in the event of default on 
the part of either the master, or his insurance carrier pay-
ing compensation, to sue for, and to prosecute a clnim for 
damages against the independent tort feasor. That plain-
tiff's maf\ter, the Fruit Growers Express, and its insurance 
carrier, the- Travellers Insurance Company, have both and 
each failed and neglected to sue ·the defendant herein, the 
. independent tort feasor negligently causing plain-
page. 24 ~ tiff the injuries alleged, as aforesaid,· whereby and 
as a result whereof plaintiff was re•tnired and com-
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pelled to institute this action, and any recovery had herein 
will be subject to the orders of tl1is Conrt:, nnd that the ... 1\ct 
of tlliA Sta~e adopted solely as an insurance feature and 
solely for the bcn~tH .. o~ th~ mns~er _and. servant op~~ating 
thereund~r cannot b:e 111voked by the, defendantt an independ~ 
ent tort fe~o1·, ':vhich negli.g·.ei1tly /injured plaintiff as afore-
said, as a bar to this action as the said plaintiff hath in his 
said plea in that beh~alf alleged.· · ! 




R. H. YEATMAN, 
"\VILSON :i\L FARR., 




J .. . : . 
page· 25 ~In the Circuit Court for Arlington County, 
Virginia. 
Filed November 8, 1928. 
;J oscph Horsman, Plaintiff, - ~~ --
vs. 
·IUchmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad Company, 
a Corporation, Dcf~ndant. · ·: , · · ' 
: '.:_ '! 
At: Law. '1 Replication: to· Special Plea. 
-~ • '· f 
,, . 
Tho said plaintiff·--comes and says that by· ·reason· of/'}l:iry-
thing by the said defendant in its plea alleged the :d"Qc1ara-
tion in this action and this action ought not to be dismiss eel, 
hecause he says, that at the time of the commission by the 
defendant of the negligent acts in the manner and form set 
forth in the declaration filed herein and at the time of the 
·injuries negligently inflicted by the said defendant upon him, 
the said plaintiff, and at the time of the commission by de-
fendant of the negligent acts set forth in the dqclaration filed 
herein proximately causing the injuries sustained· by·, the 
plaintiff, plaintiff w~s not in the .employ of the defendant 
nnd that said defendant· 'va~r an independent t.ort feasor and 
as such independent tort feasor, defendant neglig·ently in-
flicted upon plaintiff the sundry injuries sustained by him in 
th~ way, manner and form set forth in the declaration filed 
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. herein. That plaintiff has heretofore caused both the writ 
nnd declaration filed herein to be endorsed with the state-
ment that this action is for the benefit of the Fruit Growers 
Express, a_nd. the __ Travellers_ Insurance Company_ and . the 
plaintiff as. their r-espective interests· ~ay be shown.'·· :. · 
That the said defendant, as admitted in the said plea, is 
an indepen.dent tort feasor ai!.d that plaintiff sustained the 
injuries in the way, manner, form aud at the time and place 
snt forth in the declaration as the proximate result of action-
able acts of. negligence on the part of the defendant and the 
matters and things set forth in the special plea filed 
page 26 ~ by the defendant, which said special plea is in sub-
stance a general issue plea, do not constitute any 
dcfcnf.:e to plaintiff's cause of action against the defendant 
and do 11ot constitute a bar to- p~aintiff's rig~ht to _recover of 
the ·defendant~·the damages sustained·· as the p_roximate result 
of its negligent _con~u~t as alleged in the cleclaration;··and 
tl1~t· any recovery in t_h.is action agaii1st tl1e defendant is sub-
ject to su·ch dis-tribution_ amop.g the plaintiff, the Fruit Grow-
ers Express_ and _t1Ie T_:ravellers Insurance Company as may 
he .determin~d .by this Court. · · . 
And plaintiff because of the matters a11d ·things her.einbe-
fore set forth, denies that by reason· of anything by t)H~ said 
defendant ~n its. pl~a alleg~d, thts c,ause ot actiori against the 
defendant a'nd· the· i·ig·llt ·to recover damages against the de-
fendant. in this action, is barred. 




J.OSE:PH 1-IOR.S~fAN, Plaintiff, 
By Counsel. 
vVI'fjTQN J. LJ\:1\fB_ER.~, 
WILSON 1\f. FAR-R;. :· . 
RUDOLPH H. YEATl\fAN, 
Counsel for Plaintiff: 
page 27 } · Circuit· Co1irt for ·the C.ountY. of :Arlington, Vir-
giJ.1].a, continued and h.eld at tpe Court House there-
ofJ ~t 1() o 'clpck A~ M:., Fr~chiy·;· January the 4th, -'iri the' year 
of ~·out: -L'o~d;. ~inet.een H:undxed· a)\d Twmity-nine. 
Present: The lion. IIoward W. Smith, Judge. 
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ORDER., OCTOBER TER~f, 1928. 
Joseph Horsman, Plaintiff, 
ve. 
Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad Company, 
a Corporation, Defendant. 
This day came the parties in- person and by their counsel, 
and thereupon the plaintiff moved the Court for pe_rmission 
to endorse the original writ herein and the declaration herein 
with a statement that this action, filed by the plaintiff, Joseph 
Iforsman, is for the use and benefit of the Fruit Growers Ex-
press and the Travellers Insurance Company and the plain-
tiff, Joseph Horsman, as their respective interests may be 
shown, to which endorsement defendant by counsel objects, 
which motion the Court gTanted, to which ruling· of the Court 
defendant duly excepted, and the said statement was duly 
endorsed upon the said \Vrit and declaration; and thereupon 
this action came on to be heard upon the writ and declaration 
with the aforesaid statement thereon- endorsed, upon the 
amended special plea filed by the defendant, upon the writ-
ten motion of the pla~ntiff heretofore filed to strike out and 
reject said amended plea (said motion assig-ning the grounds 
therefor), argument of counsel for Plaintiff and defendant 
on said motion having been heretofore heard, and the Court 
being of the opinion that said amended plea of defendant 
constitutes a good and valid defense and· a bar as a matter 
of Jaw to this action if the facts therein alleged are true, doth 
now overrule_ the motion filed by plaintiff to strike 
page 28 ~ out and reject the said amended plea, to which ac-
tion of the Court the plaintiff by counsel duly ex-
cepts on the g·rounds set up in his said motion and because 
the matters alleged in the said special plea do not constitute 
a valid defense to and a bar, as a matter of law or defense 
on tl1e· merits to this action. 
AND THERE-UPON Plaintiff, ·without waiving his excep-
tion to the aforesaid ruling of the Court, but expressly in-
sisting thereon, filed his replication to the said special plea 
and defendant field its general rejoinder to said replication 
upon which said plea and replication and rejoinder thereto 
issue was duly joined. 
AND THER.EUPON this matter came on for hearing 
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before the Court, all matters of law and fact being submitted 
to the Court without a jury, neither plaintiff nor defendant 
requesting a trial by jury, (both plaintiff and defendant waiv-
ing a trial by jury) ; and plaintiff introduced and offered the 
evidence of sundry witnesses to sustain the allegations of the 
declaration and to prove that he suffered the alleged injuries. 
as a proximate result of the negligent acts of the defendant 
as alleged in the declaration and to I further prove the amount 
of his damages and to prove that lthe defendant was an in-
dependent tort feasor at the time of committing the negli-
gent acts in the way, manner and form set forth in the 
declaration, proximately causing the injury to plaintiff re-
sulting in the loss of both of hh1 I han dB and thE: other iu · 
juries and damages set forth in the declaration, to the ad-
mission of all of which evidence the defendant by counsel, 
objected, and all of which evidence offered in behalf of plain-
tiff over the objection of counsel for plaintiff and upon mo-
tion of counsel for defendant, the Court struck out, excluded 
and refused to weigh and consider, to which action of the 
Court. the plaintiff. by counsel duly excepted. 
AND THEREUPON defendant, in support of its special 
plea offered a certified copy of the record in Claim No. 53332 
· before the Industrial Commission of Virginia, 
page 29 r Joseph Horsman, Claimant vs. Fruit Growers Ex-
press Company, Employer, and Travellers Insur-· · 
ance Company, Insurance Carrier, and evidence to establish 
that the plaintiff herein, Joseph Horsman, is the saine .J osepli 
Horsman who is and was the aforesaid claimant and 'vho 
received and is receiving the award made by the Industrial 
Commission as shown in said certtfied copy of said record. 
AND THEREUPON to the introduction of all of which 
evidence in behalf of the defendant, the plaintiff objected on 
the ground that the same is immaterial and constitutes no 
valid defense and bar to this action which objection the Court 
overruled, and admitted said evidence to which action of the 
Court plaintiff excepted. 
After argument of counsel, the Opurt being of the opinion 
that the right of action herein is barred as a matter of law 
and that this action cannot be maintained against the de-
fendant, doth now adjudge and order that this action be and 
the same is now dismissed at the costs of the plaintiff, to 
which several rulings and actions of the Gourt in striking 
out and excluding all of the evidence offered and introduced 
--~-----,---------
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by and in behalf of plaintiff as aforesaid, and in admitting 
and considering the aforesaid evidence offered by and in be- . 
half of the defendant, and in holding that no cause of action 
against defendant herein exists and in entering judgment for 
the defendant and dismissing this action plaintiff by counsel 
duly excepts 011 tire groun~d tha:t the evidenc'e offered by and 
in behalf of plaintiff is relevant and competent and entitles 
plaintiff"to maintain this action and to recover a verdict and· 
;judgment against the defendant; on the ground ~hat the evi-
dence offered in behalf of defendant is: incom.petent and im-: 
material. to the: -issues· ii1 this action; and on the gr9und. that-
the defense ·sbught to be established· by defendant's: evideuc_e 
constitutes no valid defense in la'v or fact to the· issues and 
constitutes no bar to the right of action herein,-. 
page 30 ~ and that the verdict and judgment of the Court 
is without evidence- to sustain it and is contrary 
to the law and the evidence. 
· A.ND .. THERJ;JUPON plaintiff further .moved the Court to 
enter judgment. h1 this action against the defe'ndant- for the 
damages sustained ·by him as· sought· to be establislied ··by 
the evidense for and in his behalf in such sum as the Court 
might deem fair and proper, not to :exceed .the amount set 
forth in~ the dech:lratiun· for·the benefit of the Fruit Growers 
Express, the Travellers Insurance Company and the ·Plain-
tiff, as their r'espective intei·ests mig'llt appear ·arid be 'ascer~ 
tained by the Court, ·which ·motion, the ·Go1l.rt overruled, to 
"\vhich action .of t.l1e .. co·urt, Plaintiff, by counsel, 'duly ex-
·cepted. · i · 
AND Plaintiff, ha-\ring· signified his intention of applying 
to the Supreme Court of Appeals for a ·writ of· error, it is 
further. ordered that the operation of this order be suspended 
for a p~riod of ninety (90) days, conditioned upon the Plain .. 
tiff, or some one for him, entering into bqnd before the Clerk 
of this Court, in the penalty of One Hundred ($100.00) Dol-
lars, with approved surety, conditioned as the la'v directs, 
within ten (10) days from the ·rising of this Gourt. · _ 
HOWARD W. S}.fiTH, Judge. 
page 31 ~ Joseph I-Iorsman, Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad Company, 
· Defendant. 
Joseph Horsman v. R., F. & P. R. R. Co. 47 
Be it remembered that in the trial of the issue joined in 
this case and after all the evidence in behalf of the plaintiff 
had been offered and had been rejected, excluded and stricken 
out by the Court over the objection of the Plaintiff, and after 
all of the evidence offered by defendant had been introduced 
for and in its belialf,- to the 'inti·oduction of which plaintiff 
duly objected and moved to strike out and exclude said evi-
deilce, on the ground that same is irrelevant, incompetent 
aild inadmissa.hle, and after the Court had indicated its pur-
pose to enter final ~udgment in behalf of the defendant and 
had dismissed plaintiff's ·cause of action, the ·plaintiff, by 
eoilnsel:moved· the Court in ai·rest ·of judginent and· to· set 
aside its judgment:· and ·to ascertain the .amount of his dam~ 
ages and to ·enter· final judgment therefor in his behalf- against 
the defendant, (said judgment to be for the: nse and . .benefit 
of the Fruit Gro,vers Express ·Company,. the Travellers In-
f;!Urance Company and Plaintiff as their respective interests 
might be ascertained}, for ·errors apparent upon the face of. 
the -rerlord; -and- to set aside the said judgment and grant 
plaintiff a nmy trial; :because the Court etred in refusing to 
consider the evidence tendered and offered in ·behalf ·of the 
plaintiff and in striking out and excluding all of the evidence 
offered in his . behalf and declining to consider the same .~ncl 
because the Court erred in admitting the evidence offered in 
behalf of the defendant on the g-round that the said evidence 
is immaterial, incompetent and irrelevant has no bearing upon 
the· cause of action set forth in· plaintiff's declaration, and 
. . .~ ~ constitutes no bar to plaintiff's ca'use ·of action; 
page. 32 ~ _bee a use the said judgment is contrary to the law 
and the ~evidence and is without evidence to sup-
port it; and because the evidence offered by and in behalf of 
plaintiff is relevnnf and competent and entitled plaintiff to 
maintain tlils action and to .recove-r a verdict and judgment 
against the defendant for the injuries and damages suffered 
by him as the proximate re.sult of the negligence of defendant, 
but the· Court overruled all of the said motions of plaintiff, 
to which action· of the Court hi so doing and entering final 
judgment for the defendant and dismissing this action, the 
plaintiff then and there excepted and prays that this, his bill 
of exception No. 1, may be signed, sealed, enrolled and made 
a part of the record in this case, whieh is accordingly done, 
and the Court now certifies that the following· is the evidence 
ai1d all of the ~vidence tendered by the plaintiff and the de-
fendant in the trial of this case. 
· In support of the allegations set forth in the decl~ration 
plaintiff called in his behalf the following who ~yere tendered 
. . -
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as witnesses in his behalf, to-wit, Joseph Horsman, Ashley 
S'nellings and John Travers, each of whom would have tes-
tified in support of the allegations of negligence set forth 
in the_ declaration, and would have further testified as fol-
lows: 
Joseph Horsman : Plaintiff herein, was born December 
29, 1903, on December 10, 1924, the date of the injuries re-
ceived by him, said plaintiff was then in good health and had 
theretofore enjoyed good health and was then in the employ 
of the Fruit Growers Express and had been in such employ 
since the 4th day of October, 1922. He was employed by the 
Fruit Growers Express, a Corporation operating a car re-
pairing yard in Potomac Yards in the County of Arlington, 
State of Virginia, for the repair of sundry refrig-
pag~ 33 r erator and freight cars owned and caused to be 
operated by it in _interstate commerce, for a period 
of about 5 months as day laborer and was them employed 
as a car painter, painting cars and parts replaced Qn cars 
which were stored .on tracks operated and ca;use to be oper-
ated by the said Fruit Growers Express in said Arlington 
County as aforesaid, and at the time of being injured he was 
receiving $4.00 per day. 
That the defendant in this action is an independent Cor-
poration engaged in the operation of a steam railroad includ-
ing the maintenance of sundry railroad tracks in Arlington 
County, Virginia, ~nd in said Potomac Yards and operated 
in said Yards and elsewhere in said County and .State, en-
gines, propelled by; steam, cars, coaches, ·and both freight and 
passenger trains for hire. 
That plaintiff,_ so employed by the Fruit Growers Express 
Company as aforesaid, was under the immediate direction, 
supervision and orders of one Julian Bettis, likewise then an 
employee and foreman of the said Fruit Growers Express 
Company, and that on the lOth day of December, 1924, his said 
foreman directed plaintiff to get some stencils, paint brush and 
paint and accompanied the said plaintiff to a certain portion 
of (he yard in Potomac ·Yards called the west yard and there 
directed him, the said plaintiff, to re-stencil certain portions of 
the numbers on both the east and west side of ·a car then 
standing on one of the tracks in said west yard, known as the 
advance track, which said car bore the name of the Fruit 
Growers Express Company, and was owned and caused to be 
operated from time to time for hire by the said Fruit Grow-
ers Express Company and was intended to be used in inter-
state commerce. That the said car was the seventh or eighth 
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car from the end in a long line of twenty-five cars then all 
stationary on the said track, all of "Thich had been 
page 34 ~ either then repaired or on which repairs were then 
being completed, and to which no engine or motive 
power was then attached. That no rules or directions had 
ever been given plaintiff, requiring him to put out any warn-
ing or flag to indicate that he was painting either the afore-
said car on which he was then stencilling or any of the prior 
cars in said yard that he had theretofore been engaged. in 
painting or stencilling in the course of his employment. That 
- his said foreman directed plaintiff to re-stencil certain por-
tions of the numbers and letters on both the east and 'vest 
side of said car where the portions of the original numbers 
and letters had been destroyed by the substitution of ne'v 
boards in place of the boarqs removed therefrom on b.oth sides 
said car on which he was then stencilling or any of the p-rior 
foreman, had with him some seven or eight stencils, two paint 
brushes, and a small quantity of paint in a pan, and pur- · 
suant to the orders and directions of the said foreman, he 
went to work and completed the work directed to be done on 
the east side of the car which necessitated his reaching the 
west side of the car to compl-ete the work s·o directed. · 
·That the custom and practice· of plaintiff and the other 
employees in the said yard similarly engaged 'vas to crawl 
under cars to reach the opposite side thereof and that on the 
said lOth day of December, 1924, plaintiff, after completing 
the 'vork on the east side of said car, took his paint brushes 
arid certain of the stencils and started under the car at a 
point between the rear truck wheels and the bumper thereof, 
said ca~ and the line of cars in which it stood being then 
stationary with no engine or motive power 4ereto attached. 
That as plaintiff reached the opposite rail of the 
page 35 ~ track he placed his hands on said rail to pull him-
self from under the car and while his hands were 
iu this position on said rails, the defendant in order to clear 
a main line track in said yard, cat~sed a certain yard or shift-
ing engine and tender o'vned and operated by it to be backed 
without warning or notice to plaintiff, rapidly and 'vith great 
force and violence in and against the aforesaid string of sta-
tionary cars on one of which plaintiff 'vas then 'vorking as 
aforesaid, suddenly and violently starting all of them in mo-
tiori, including the car under which plaintiff then was with 
his hands on the rail of the track as aforesaid, with the result 
that the rear truck wheels of said car ran over both of plain-
tiff's wrists and hands. Tha.t no warning or notice was given. 
to plaintiff of defendant's intention to wrongfully set the 
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said train of cars in motion and that no investigation was 
made or caused to be made by defendant to ascertain prior 
to so doing whether or not plaintiff or any ·other employees 
of the Fruit Growers Express Company were working on any 
one of said cars in said line, although defendant knew that 
employees of the Fruit Growers Express, including plain-
tiff, daily were working on, in and about cars stored in lines 
of cars on said track; and that under the custom and prac-
tice, defendant knew, of the Fruit Growers Express, its em-
ployees, including plaintiff, would, at such time, in ·an like-
lihood, be engaged in working on one or more of said cars 
in the then sftid stationary line of cars. That as result of this 
negligence on the part of defendant, both of plaintiff's hands 
and wrists were so mashed and mangled as to necessitate his 
being immediately removed to the Alexandria City liospital. 
That plaintiff was confined in said hospital from t~1e lOth day 
. of December, 1924, to the 24th da.y of February, 1925, and 
that while so confined in said hospital, plaintiff 
page 36 ~ suffered great pain and anguish and was compelled 
undergo and did undergo two operations, the first 
for the removal of botl1 of his 'vrists and and hands and the 
sec01id operation on his righ.t a1•m for the removal of a portion 
of the bone. 
That the Fruit Growers Express Company, plaintiff's said 
employer, is a corporation owning sundry cars and operating 
independently of, and has no connection with, the defendant 
herein. · 
That defendant herein is a separate and distinct corpora-
tion from the Fruit Growers Express Company, and owns 
and operates a certain railroad consisting of tracks located 
within and without the said Arlington County over which it 
operates both freight and passenger trains and that said de-
fendant is the owner and operator of a. system of storage and 
transfer tracks in said .1\.rling-ton County, Virginia, known 
as Potomac Yards; that on the said storage tracks in said 
storage yards, plaintiff's employer, the Fruit Growers Ex-
press Company, stored from time to time, sundry of its cars 
and caused sundry repairs to be made thereon and tl1ereto 
and employed in and about such repairs, sundry workmen, 
including plaintiff, all of which was lmown to the said de-
fendant. · 
That Plaintiff has received no compensation from the de-
fendant herein for the damage caused him hy defendant's 
wrongful and negligent conduct. That plaintiff has received 
compensation under the Workman's Compensation Act from 
the Travellers Insurance Company, the Insurance Carrier of 
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his employer, the Fruit Growers Express Company, and that 
he accepted such compensation with no knowledge that by so 
doing-, he in any 'vise waive"d his rights to recover 
lJage 37 ~ from defendant herein, and without waiving his 
rights against defendant, an independent tort 
feaso-r for the damage and injuries occasioned him by its 
said negligence. 
That plaintiff had worked prior to the lOth -day of Decem-
ber, 1924, at similar work to the work being performed by 
him on said date on cars stored on the same track on which 
was stored the car upon whicl1 he was working on said date 
and that he had been informed and told by his said employer 
that he could work thereon with safety as before the cre'v 
of any engine of defendant would come in and set any ·cars 
on said track in motion, they would first investig·ate and as-
certain that this could be done without danger of. injury to 
plaintiff or any one working in and about cars stored thereon. 
That this was the established custom, rule and practice then 
prevailing and that defendant and its servants and agents had 
notice and knowledge of such custom, rule and practice. 
That plaintiff has been through the 5th grade at school~ 
is unmarried, and that the loss of both his hands and his 
wrists l1as unfitted him to perform the only work, namely, 
manual labor fol· which he is qualified. 
Ashley Snellings: That he is an employee of the Fruit 
Growers Express and w·as in their employ as a car repairer 
on the lOth day ·of December, 1924, and had been so em-
ployed for a considerable period of time prior to that date. 
That on said date he was engaged in his said work standing 
on a storage track in Potomac Yards and saw one Julian 
Bettis, an employee of the Fruit Growers Express Company 
and foreman in its yards, going to one of the cars owned 
by the Fruit Growers Express Company, standing 
page 38 ~ in a lm1g line of cars likewise owned by it in said 
Potomac Y a.rds, on a track known as the advance 
track, in company with ,Joseph Horsman, then and thereto-
fore an employee of said F·~uit Gro·w·ers Express· Company 
and sa'v said Bettis direct the said ,Joseph Horsman to do 
certain paint work on a car in said line of cars all o{ which 
were then stationary with no engine or motive power thereto 
nttached. That he had known ,Joseph Horsman during the 
time he was employed by the Fruit Growers Express Com-
pany and that on said date said Horsman was in excellent 
health and so far as. he knew, he always had enjoyed excel-
lent health. That the said Julian Bettis left Horsman en-
52 Supreme Court ·of Appeals of Virginia. 
gaged in the work on said car which he, the said Bettis, l1ad 
directed him to do,. and that he, the said Snellings, was then 
engaged a short distance from where the said Horsman was, 
in repair work on, another one of the cars of said Fruit 
Growers Express Company, standing. on an adjacent track 
and that in a short while he heard an outcry from the said 
Horsman and saw the string of cars on one of which the 
said Horsman ;had been working, in motion; that when he 
arrived where IIorsman was he found him on the opposite 
side of the said car from which he had first seen him and 
that said car and the line of cars in which it was, was not then 
in motion, and saw blood on the rail where the wheels of the 
rear truck of said car had passed over both of the hands 
and .wrists of said Horsman; that he in company with one 
John Travers, another employee of the Fruit Growers Ex-
press Company, assisted iu removing the said Joseph Hors-
man to the Alexandria. City Hospital. That the said Hors-. 
man had to have both hands amputated at said Hospital, and 
was confined there for a considerable period of time; that 
he had known the said Horsman, as stated, some hvo or.three 
years prior to the· date of the accident and that he, 
. iJage 39 ~ the sajd Horsman, 'vas young, active and vigorous, 
. ·and had no defects of sight or hearing. 
John Travers, an employee of· the Fruit Gro,vers Express 
Company, whose testimony was to the same effect as that of 
the said Ashley Snellings. · · 
'fo all of which evidence the defendant by counsel duly 
objected, on the ground that the plaintiff herein had accepted 
compensation under the 'Vorkman's Compensation Act from 
the Travellers Insurance Company, the Insurance Carrier of 
his employer, the Fruit Growers Express Company, and that 
by accepting such compensation, plaintiff was barred from in-
stituting this action and moved to strke out and exclude the 
said evidence so rendered in behalf of Plaintiff, which motion 
of the defendant the Court, over the objection and exception 
of counsel for plaintiff, granted, and struck out, excluded and 
refused to consider any or any part of said evidence iu be-
half of plaintiff, and thereupon defendant by counsel offered. 
in evidence a certified copy of the record in Claim No. 53332 
before the Industrial Commission of Virginia, Joseph Hors-
man, claimant, against Fruit Growers Express Company, 
• Employer and Travellers Insurance ·Company, Insurance 
Carrier, and thereupon counsel for plaintiff moved to strike 
i ~ • . 0 • • 
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.out and exclude .the said evidence on the ground. that it is 
immaterial, irrelevant and incompetent a11d has no bearing 
upon the issue set forth in the. declaration. filed in this case 
and on the further ground that said evidence cm1stitutes no 
bar either in fact or in .law, to plaintiff's cause. of action, 
:which motion in behalf of plaintiff, the Court overruled and 
considered said record as .evidence barring plaintiff fro~ the 
right to institute, maintain .and p:rosecut~ this. ~ctio:tt, to 
which . further ruling of. the. Court plaintiff by 
page 40 ~ counsel likewise duly excepted. 
This 23rd day of February, 1929: 
. . 
(.Signed) HO'\VAR.D \V. Sl\IITH, Judge. (Seal) 
-- . . . . 
page 41 ~ I, vYm .. .II. Dun~au, Clerk of the Circuit Gourt of 
Adington C.ounty, Virginia, the same being a 
.Court of record, dp hereby certify that. the foregoing writ-
ings are tru.e . copies of papers of record and on file in my 
office aforesaid, and that they together constitute the record 
iu the case of _,Joseph IIorsman, Plaintiff, vs. Richmond, Fred-
ericksburg and Potomac Hailroacl Company, a. Cm:poration, 
Defendant, now pending in the aforesaid Court. 
It is. further certified that the applicant,. Joseph Horsman, 
:has duly notified counseL for ... the l~ichmond, Fredericksburg 
and Poto;rnac Ra.ilroad Company, a Corporation, the defend7 
ant herein, for this tran$cript Qf record, that the said counsel 
was duly .notified for the signing· of the bill of exc.eptions · 
herein,.and that the. suspending bond -required for the appli-
cation to the Sui)rcme Court of Appeals for :a ·writ of erro~ 
herein, has been .duly executed with approved surety by me, 
conditioned as the law directs. 
L 
Given under niy. h~ud this 8th day of 1\Iay, 1929. 
. . 
. W~L H. DUNCAN, 
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